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1 . Introduction  
 
 On April 23rd 2008, near the town of Small Sefadu in the Kono District of Sierra 
Leone, hundreds of young people invaded a company-held alluvial mining site and pro-
ceeded to load the diamondipherous sand into buckets and onto trucks. They continued for 
five days as their numbers multiplied to more than a thousand, until overpowered by the po-
lice and military. Clashes broke out, and some youth turned back towards the city of Koidu, 
where the attack on the sand hill degenerated into general violence and vandalism which 
lasted for several days. What drove them to commit such a bold and defiant act and how 
should this event be interpreted?  
 Understanding the reasons why youth are mobilized into violence – whether during 
or “post” conflict – has been a central preoccupation of academic enquiry in recent research 
on Sierra Leone. This has been the trend since Paul Richards’ challenge to the popular per-
ception of African youth, captured in Robert Kaplan’s The Coming Anarchy, as an undiffer-
entiated and irrational mass driven by extreme demographic pressures into violence and 
other destructive behaviour. Ethnographic evidence shows that youth are rational actors and 
that they exercise agency in the choices they make, (See, for example, Richards 1996; Pe-
ters 2004; De Boeck & Honwana 2005). Furthermore, there is an acknowledgement that di-
chotomous labels of victim or perpetrator; instrument or agent do not reflect the complexity 
of youth agency, (Honwana 2005; Christiensen et.al 2006). 
 Debates about the history and nature of youth culture in Sierra Leone link closely to 
debates about the causes of wars in post-Cold War Africa. One economic strand of argu-
ment, led by Collier, has promoted the explanatory potential of greed in resource-rich coun-
tries with weak governments, (Collier & Hoeffler 2004). The existence of a political econ-
omy of conflict, characterized by economic interests that are vested in perpetuating and in-
stitutionalizing the conflict, is not disputed; however, historical and anthropological ap-
proaches have found the “greed” argument reductionist and unable to explain why many of 
these wars, including the war in Sierra Leone, actually started, (Bøås & Dunn 2007). The 
grievances and aspirations, particularly of marginal youth, rooted in their historical context, 
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are increasingly seen to be at the heart of the complex causes of contemporary conflicts in 
Africa,(Kagwanja 2005; Bøås & Dunn 2007; Christiansen & Utas 2008). Such aspirations 
tend to be more about obtaining the sustainable livelihoods necessary to form and provide 
for their own families, than about greed for its own sake, (Richards 1996, 2005; Peters 
2004). Grievances about the impossibility of attaining these aspirations are often directed at 
the power holders of society, namely state and corporate actors.   
 Marginalized youth often find themselves in the contradictory position of simultane-
ously feeling hostility towards and depending on these same powerful actors to improve 
their life chances, hedging their bets between postures of defiance and devotion to maximize 
their own benefits, (Christiensen & Utas 2008). One enduring link between vulnerable 
youth and armed conflict in African societies has been shown to be the patrimonial network 
- both through its failure to provide for growing numbers of youth, and through its militari-
zation, (Abbink 2005, Vigh 2003). In an often repeated dynamic, ‘big men’ have been able 
to exploit the vulnerable position of youth to their own ends, whether by mobilizing them 
into armed militias (Vigh 2003), or by ‘domesticating’ war time violence to secure victories 
in games of political succession at the ballot box, (Rosen 2005; Christiensen & Utas 2008).  
 In Sierra Leone, recent research has suggested that this link may be breaking down 
through a combination of factors expedited by war, including the empowerment of youth 
who have survived the war, (Peters 2004, 31), and the decline of patronage (ICG 2008). 
Empowerment has been thought to be rooted in multiple experiences relating to the war, 
such as the experience of becoming a perpetrator, through which one can transcend posi-
tions of victimhood - whether of violence or marginalization pre-dating war, (Coulter 2006; 
Zack-Wiliams 2001, cited in Peters 2004, 31). In addition, the post-war period has been 
characterized by heightened levels of rights awareness and social activism among youth, 
driven by donor aid and peacebuilding interventions which have included skills training and 
civic education among their prime activities, (World Bank draft study, cited in ICG 2008, 
22). The International Crisis Group, referring to research carried out by the World Bank, 
describes one of the features of the post-war era as the ‘rise of associational life’, particu-
larly in urban areas, whereby youth increasingly rely on the peer networks accessed through 
trade associations and local development groups for a social safety net, rather than on pa-
trons, (ICG 2008, 1). Ethnographic research has provided further evidence of the growing 
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independence of youth. Frithen and Richards have shown how militia solidarities and moral 
communities formed during the war have translated into entrepreneurial independence 
whereby youth intentionally seek to limit their dependence upon manipulative big men, 
(Richards & Fithen 2005). In their article Mercenaries of Democracy, Christensen and Utas 
reveal the motives and methods of former combatants who used the opportunities opened up 
by the 2007 General Election to advance their personal short and long term needs and aspi-
rations, by cannily supporting and subverting the state, (Christensen & Utas 2008). Keen 
(2003) asserts that young people, particularly those “with greater experience of the world 
outside the chiefdom,” are less likely to submit to the authority of chiefs, (Keen 2003, 89). 
Sommers (2007) in a report on youth employment in West Africa, prefaces his recommen-
dations for engaging with the informal sector with the imperative of  understanding the 
needs of so-called ‘rebel youth’ who reject “pre-war social norms” of subjugation to the au-
thority of elders, (Sommers/UNIDO 2007, 1). 
 While not seeking to deny the transformative impact of the conflict on youth and so-
ciety more generally, this study seeks to challenge the assumption that youth agency has in-
creased in relation to elites, and argues that it is important to balance this picture with one 
that recognizes its limitations.  
 This study looks at the connection between political events and youth experiences of 
the state that underlie the local tensions that persist in the Kono District of Sierra Leone. 
The story of the attack of April 23rd - 27th 2008, on the sand dump belonging to Kariba Kono 
Ltd., when juxtaposed with the involvement of community youth groups in the local elec-
tion that followed on July 6th, provides a window onto the position of marginalized youth in 
relation to political patrons.  
 Applying Honwana’s conceptual dichotomy of tactical and strategic agency (2005), 
this study argues that, despite the evidence of eroding social norms of deference and recip-
rocity among youth in Sierra Leone, patrimonialism continues to shape, and to limit, their 







1.1 Research question 
 This study therefore asks the following question: 
Why did youth who participated in the unlawful expropriation of sand from the No.11 site 
then express such strong support for the ruling All People’s Congress (APC) party in the 
local elections which followed only two months later? 
 In order to analyze these events it addresses the following sub-questions: 
• What experiences led some young people to attack the No.11 sand dump?  
• Why was there such strong support by young people for the APC party in the local elec-
tions?
 
• Is there a connection between these actions? 
• What does the case reveal about prospects for a return to violence? 
• And centrally, what does this case tell us about youth agency in post-war Sierra Leone? 
 
 Understanding why youth pursued this particular, perplexing, course of action can 
perhaps provide a partial answer to a broader question, of whether the agency of youth has 
increased with the experiences of war and recovery.  
 
1.2 Defining the key concepts 
 Whereas the UN General Assembly defines youth as falling within the age bracket of 
15 to 24, (See UN Programme on Youth) Sierra Leone’s Youth Policy (2003), taking ac-
count of the impact of war on disrupting this period of youth, stretches the upper limit of the 
category to 35 years. Importantly, it recognizes that there may be young people falling out-
side this age bracket  “who are exposed to similar circumstances as that of the youths within 
the specified age category” and that the implementation of youth programmes ought there-
fore to be flexible in accommodating such young persons, (GoSL 2007). The policy also 
distinguishes between “youth organisations,” which are set up and managed by individuals 
falling within the stated age bracket, and which support socio and economic development, 
and ‘youth serving agencies,’ which are run by adults with the objective of supporting 
youth, (GoSL 2007). 
 This study subscribes to the view that youth is not a biological or developmental 
phase, but a socially constructed and therefore context-specific concept. The term, as it has 
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been used in Africa, is imbued with connotations of political activism, as well as social im-
mobility, (Christiansen et.al 2007).  
 Politically, the term has simultaneously evoked connotations of youth as agents of 
resistance and as instruments of oppression. The image of youth as rebellious and anti-
establishment is linked to the formation of youth culture in the twentieth century Sierra 
Leone, during which Freetown experienced several large influxes of economic migrants 
from the hinterland. In time, the resulting stratification of society into an elite colonial class, 
a Krio-dominated professional class, and a marginalized underclass of labourers and school 
dropouts made youth independent of the adult authority to which they had traditionally been 
subordinate, (Rosen 2005, 65). Markers of youth culture at this time included the odelay so-
cieties, which adapted the initiation rites, practices and supernatural beliefs of traditional 
secret societies, and which were known for their holiday masked parades that often degen-
erated into violence. Significantly, the elements of secrecy and violence embedded in the 
tradition of these societies were used to remake culture from one which was subservient to 
authority to one which challenged it. Organizationally, this translated into a horizontal “hi-
erarchy of peers,” (Rosen 2005, 69). These youth formed the backbone of the anti-colonial 
movement, under the leadership of I.T.A. Wallace-Johnson, who mobilized urban working 
class youth under his Marxist trade union association, the West African Youth League. 
Rosen explains how the emasculation of the League by a threatened Krio elite not only sti-
fled the development of post-colonial nationalism, but also sent the message that govern-
ance “was the exclusive province of the elite, and that the political mobilization of youth 
would be suppressed”, (Rosen 2005, 68). It was soon after, during the period of high stakes 
for control of the newly independent state, that political parties began to systematically re-
cruit young people as thugs to intimidate their opponents, and state-sanctioned use of vio-
lence became institutionalized, (Rosen 2005, 76). The continued associations of youth with 
rebellion and violence in Sierra Leone have their roots in these early experiences.  
 Among ethnographers, there is an acknowledgement that dichotomous labels of vic-
tim or perpetrator and of agent or instrument, do not reflect the complexity of youth agency, 
(Honwana 2005). Agency is defined by Giddens as the capability, rather than the intention to 
act, (Giddens 1984, 6). This paper assumes that understanding this complexity is necessary 
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in order to apprehend the meaning of the actions taken by youth in the case under analysis. 
In practice, this means understanding the circumstances and choices that youth face.  
 In addition to political connotations, ‘youth’ is also associated with a social immobil-
ity that is rooted in economic marginalization. Economic barriers frequently block entry into 
the formal rites of passage of adulthood; impeding the ability to make independent deci-
sions, to marry, and to adequately care for dependents. This status is summarized in the use 
of the term marginalized youth, and implies a class distinction between elite youth and those 
who remain youth or “man-children” and whose advancing years stretch the limits of the 
youth category, (Bøås 2007, 29; Sommers/UNIDO 2007,18). Without the ability to be self-
sufficient or to adequately care for dependents, it is all too possible for young people to 
grow chronologically into adulthood, without ever getting any closer to the status and au-
thority that adulthood confers. Vigh refers to youth as being a ‘social moratorium’, a state of 
dependence and constrained freedom which must be escaped. Youth is therefore not merely 
a state of being, but also a state of becoming, as youth seek to expand their horizons of pos-
sibility through social navigation, (Vigh 2007). The concept of social navigation therefore 
makes it possible to see the logic behind seemingly illogical choices of youth as they are 
placed in a context of survival and social becoming.   
 The counterpart to agency is structure, which both constrains and enables individual 
action, through social rules, (Giddens 1984). The theoretical anchor of this study is embed-
ded in Giddens’ theory of Structuration (1984), and the assumption that (youth) agents in-
teract with social forces to change and to reproduce social systems and realities, rather than 
presuming a primacy of either agent or structure. I interpret the meaning of the individual 
and collective actions of youth through the lens of patrimonialism, as a social system with 
which youth interact. Patrimonialism has been described as a feature of post-colonial Afri-
can states, which, as transplanted from colonial models, have never been fully emancipated 
from society, and which, as a result, derive their legitimacy from redistribution, (Chabal and 
Daloz 1999). Defined by hierarchical relations of reciprocity between patrons and clients, 
patrimonialism creates opportunities and barriers that youth navigate towards social becom-
ing. To the extent that youth constantly seek out ways of improving their social position, 
they may do so by playing by the rules this system, or by challenging them altogether. 
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Honwana’s conceptual dichotomy of tactical and strategic agency (2005), explored in the 
next chapter, alerts us to this important distinction.   
 
1.3 Significance of research 
 Chronic youth un- and underemployment, and the social stasis it leads to, is seen as 
being one of the major destabilizing factors that contribute to crime and could trigger re-
mobilization and re-ignite conflict, not only in Sierra Leone but across West Africa, 
(UNOWA 2006). In Sierra Leone, an estimated 76 percent of the population falls under the 
age of 35;1 in addition, one estimation by the UN Office for West Africa puts the number of 
young people lacking proper work over 50 percent, (2004 Census figures, cited in ICG 
2008, 22; UNOWA 2006, 9). There is a broad recognition that youth employment and op-
portunities for meaningful participation in the political process are urgently required to rem-
edy the alienation at the root of this instability, (UNGA S/2007/269; World Development 
Report 2007; ICG 2008).  
 McEvoy-Levy (2007) maintains that the period following a conflict is a crucial pe-
riod which can either make or break peace: 
In the longer term, a peace agreement’s endurance depends on whether the 
next generations accept or reject it, how they are socialized during the peace 
process, their perceptions of what the peace process has achieved, and their 
tangible experiences of a better life, (McEvoy-Levy 2007, 7). 
 
Given that the failure and abuses of patrimonialism is regarded as one of the causes of the 
crisis of youth that contributed to the outbreak of the war, (Richards 1996) one would ex-
pect that addressing the root causes of war would involve ensuring that youth have the 
means to free themselves from dependency on patronage. Support to youth, through dedi-
cated programmes, institutions, and funds,2 as well as the increasing practice of “main-
                                                 
1
 ICG 2008 cites a draft World Bank report, “Improving opportunities for sustainable youth employment in Sierra 
Leone,” from 28 June 2007, which estimates that 42 percent of the population is under the age of fifteen, and 34 percent 
falls between 15 and 35.  Adding these figures, 76 percent are under 35. 
2
 The National Youth Policy (2003) established strategic priorities (job creation, skills training, information and sensiti-
sation, community development projects, presidential award for excellence, youth consultation and participation) as 
well as linkages with key ministries and international development partners for implementation. The framework for 
implementation, as well as for promoting youth participation and dialogue, envisaged a National Youth Advisory 
Council, which would bring together representatives from district and chiefdom levels. In the policy, the NYAC is 
mandated to support the Ministry of Youth and Sports, and to serve as the communication channel between government 
and all affiliated youth organisations. Youth programmes are intended to be implemented at the district level, through 
District Youth Councils, that are mandated to identify youth concerns, needs and opportunities, as well as programmes 
and projects, and to implement and monitor such projects, in collaboration with local organizations. However, the 
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streaming of youth” into labour, health and other areas of policy, are intended to empower 
youth by “creating a level playing field for youths to actualise their fullest potentials...” (Na-
tional Youth Policy 2003). The current government has committed itself to the issue of 
“youth employment and empowerment,” which currently includes plans to review the 
Peacebuilding and Youth Basket Fund, a project on youth employment in the agricultural 
sector through the National Commission for Social Action which is being implemented, the 
creation of a National Youth Commission, and the review of the National Youth Policy, but 
no national youth employment strategy is in place, (SL Peacebuilding Cooperation Frame-
work 2008). Whether these mechanism are reducing the dependence of youth on patrons, or 
whether patronage networks have merely adapted to new modalities is not clear, (ICG: 
2008, 5). It is beyond the scope of this paper to describe the formal framework through 
which individuals and youth groups are able to access state and donor support, and to feed-
back into local and national policy processes. However, a challenge of such efforts is to ac-
commodate the reality of the diversity of youth, in terms of their social backgrounds, their 
educational attainment, their capacities to organize and participate in dialogues, and so on. 
Treating youth as a homogenous cohort risks creating programmes that in practice advan-
tage the elite and socially well-connected youth who tend to have more well developed ca-
pacities for engagement in formal systems. Sommers, recounting a visit to a rural youth 
training programme in Liberia in 2005, observes how marginalized “rebel youth” were not 
among the beneficiaries, (Sommers/UNIDO: 2007, 1). He adds that the bias towards rural 
and formal sector in youth employment generation programmes are not adapted to the reali-
ties that most youth inhabit, which in Sierra Leone has been that many of those who flee the 
constraint of social options at the hands of elders in rural areas and find their survival in the 
sprawling and unregulated informal sector of urban areas, (Sommers, UNIDO: 2007, 9). 
This paper agrees with the argument that effective programmes must be rooted in the social 
realities that youth (differentiated) inhabit, and aims to shed some light on the political di-
mensions of this reality among marginalised youth.  
  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
NYAC has not been constituted, and only some District Councils have been constituted, due to funding constraints. A 
new body, the Youth Commission, is being established under the APC government.  
  14 
 
1.4 Kono background 
 The research was conducted in and around Koidu city. Located 225 miles East of 
Freetown, it is the main city of Kono District which shares a border with Guinea (Annex 1), 
and which is known for its diamonds and for having suffered the worst destruction during 
the war. Kono has a long history of economic migration, beginning from the initial mining 
boom of the 1930s, under colonial administration. Struggles to control the resources began 
during this period. Faultlines that divided settler and migrant rights to mining access origi-
nated during the colonial administration, with a power accorded to chiefs to determine 
strangers, (Bøås & Hatløy 2006, 21; Fanthrope 2005). Subsequent post-colonial govern-
ments politicised both the chieftaincy and mining access. This stoked the grievances of an 
underclass of rural youth and illegal diamond miners who had neither rights nor privilege, 
and who were expelled en masse from the mining zones by a corrupted army that estab-
lished its own foothold in the industry. With the outbreak of war, the Revolutionary Armed 
Front insurgency absorbed much of the young, socially disconnected rural population, in-
cluding many of Kono’s migrating miners, (Bøås & Hatløy; 2006, 19). Collusion of subse-
quent regimes with warring factions for political objectives and for enrichment, and be-
tween the army and the rebel insurgency on the ground prolonged the war, (Keen 2003, 81). 
By 1998 the RUF controlled diamond mining and smuggling in the region, (Bøås & Hatløy; 
2006, 19). In the first post-war administration, the SLPP government policies aimed at in-
creasing legal diamond trading. But these have not served to heal the rift between traditional 
elites and the underclass of mining and other rural youth, (de Koning 2008, 7). 
 Although migration has not returned to its pre-war levels, and alluvial mining is said 
to be drying up, young people continue to go to Kono seeking fortune through mining and 
related support activities,(Bøås & Hatløy 2006, 20). Kono’s population reflects the ethnic 
and religious diversity of the country, though migrants from the northern (and largely agrar-
ian) districts of Koinadugu and Bombali are predominant, (Bøås & Hatløy 2006, 37). A 
study by Bøås and Hatløy shows that though mining is seen to be a migrant activity, as 
many as half of those surveyed were found to be indigenous.  
 As a form of livelihood, alluvial mining is extremely strenuous labour, and while it 
pays relatively well compared to other jobs, for the many who are not members of mining 
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teams, it is an insecure income, (Bøås & Hatløy 2006, 67). Most (mainly young men) see 
their work as temporary and hold out the hope of doing “something else” later, be it educa-
tion, other work, (Bøås & Hatløy 2006, 73). 
 For those looking to do something else, there are few viable alternatives in Koidu, 
Kono’s main city. Years of mining have brought little in terms of development to the re-
gion, and what little progress had been made was destroyed by the war. Eighty five percent 
of the houses were burned by the rebels wishing to control the diamond exploitation, and 
little reconstruction has taken place, (Bøås & Hatløy 2006, 20). Most of the houses in the 
central area remain roofless, some with only weathered tarpaulins that leak with the rain. 
The dusty, potholed roads are difficult to negotiate in anything other than a bike, electricity 
is available by generators, and only selected establishments have private running water. 
Kono has no institutions for tertiary education, and few can afford to complete their secon-
dary education, let alone leave to further their education. Plans to develop the agricultural 
sector have a long way to go before they can offer the needed absorptive capacity for those 
seeking livelihood.  
   
1.5 Case study 
 The selected methodology for this research project is the qualitative case study. Ac-
cording to Yin, the case study method of enquiry is justified where contemporary phenom-
ena is being studied, where contextual conditions are believed to be highly relevant, and 
where the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, (Yin 2003). 
 With the exception of background research, most of the questions raised in this study 
concerned recent and ongoing events, and answering them required on-site data collection. 
Preliminary research on the internet had uncovered online newspaper articles describing 
several recent incidents of unrest involving youth and mining company in Kono. I had also 
learned from a Koidu-based contact that high numbers of young people were running in the 
local elections in Kono. The anticipated connection between these events - increased youth 
agency - was worthy of study. In addition, the political configuration of power going into 
the local elections (a Kono native as VP who had not won a seat in the general elections) 
created a unique situation in the history of Kono that was worthy of study in its own right. 
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Due to limitations in research capacity and unavailability of ready and relevant data sources, 
there is no quantitative aspect to the study.  
 With the exception of several online newspaper articles, there was an almost com-
plete lack of secondary data on either of these developments. Administrative records had 
been destroyed during the war, making it impossible to obtain certain types of information.3 
As a result, I relied primarily on interviews and conversations. I triangulated these with par-
ticipant observation and, where possible, with relevant documentation from youth groups, 
and contextualized this current information with the academic literature. My ability to navi-
gate the research terrain, and my analysis of these events draws significantly on the body of 
scholarly research, as is explained below.   
 
1.6 Research design 
 The purpose of a research design is to plan “what you are going to ask, whom you 
are going to ask, and why”, (Marshall & Rossman 1989, cited in Rubin & Rubin 1995, 42). 
Rather than setting a rigid agenda for data collection, the research design is a tool that en-
ables systematic data collection in an unpredictable environment by clarifying an overarch-
ing motivation for collecting data, (Rubin & Rubin 1995, 42,43).  
 A flexible design makes it possible to correct wrong assumptions, and accommodate 
emerging themes. On the continuum between exploratory and confirmatory research de-
signs, this study is situated closer to the exploratory end. Originally, I had expected that the 
events in Kono were evidence of a growing pattern of post-war youth empowerment, as in-
dicated by increased participation in formal political processes (more young candidates run-
ning in local elections) and non-legal actions (land grabs, labour strikes against mining 
companies and official demands made to government), and had prepared interview guides 
for different groups of respondents based on this assumption. However, I gradually began to 
see this case as an example of the opposite proposition, highlighting, rather, the continued 
dependence of youth on patrons, (See Bøås 2007). When the evidence failed to adequately 
confirm the theory, the aim of the design shifted towards exploration and adapting theory in 
order to explain what was observed. 
                                                 
3
 For instance, neither the City Council and District Statistics Office had a map of Koidu. 
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 Setting the parameters of this case was difficult given the breadth of the events and 
actors involved. Initially, I had considered doing a cross-case comparison of youth attacks 
on mining companies in several different chiefdoms; however, arriving several weeks be-
fore the elections during a period of high activity, I decided that this was not realistic and 
that it was better to limit the data collection to the activities in and around Koidu and the 
No.11 site within Gbense Chiefdom, in order to better understand the complexities of the 
context and actors. 
 Huberman and Miles (1994) explain how data collection and analysis ought to be 
carried out in tandem, as iterative processes that work together to refine the conceptual 
framework and to guide data selection and avoid data overload (Huberman & Miles 1994, 
55). Rubin and Rubin add that selecting what is important ought to be determined by what is 
important to respondents, (Rubin & Rubin 1995, 46).The timing of interviews, around the 
local elections, contributed to how responses were framed. When asked about No.11, many 
youth would then end up talking about the previous SLPP government. When asked about 
their political activities, youth groups often preferred to discuss their plans and aspirations 
for funding and employment. I used an open and continuous design which meant that ques-
tions were constantly reformulated, and key informants changed on the basis of new infor-
mation obtained during the course of research, (Rubin & Rubin 1995, 42,43). While ques-
tions and topics changed with each respondent, these centred on a puzzle - that youth who 
had challenged patrons in the No.11 attack several months earlier were predominantly in 
support of APC and the government of the day. Having previously been interested in the ap-
parent expansion of youth agency, I began to probe the depth of patrimonial loyalty.  
  Given the dearth of other sources of information, I relied principally on conversa-
tions and interviews, for cross-referencing information about events, and for analyzing nar-
ratives. I began by speaking with community youth groups and representatives, partly be-
cause they were very visible during the campaign period, and partly as a way to understand-
ing the political youth context. Out of 111 documented group and individual discussions 
and interviews carried out in Freetown and Koidu, roughly 64 were with individual youths 
and youth-led groups (some of which I spoke with a number of times), of which 35 de-
scribed some sort of political involvement in relation to the local or general elections, and of 
which 19 explained their support for the government in power or demonstrated a type of 
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shape shifting behaviour. Overall, only 14 interviews (individual and group) were with 
youth who participated in the attack on No.11, although all of these youth also discussed 
their support for the ruling party. Part of the reason for this number being rather low as a 
proportion to the overall number of conversations with young people was that many youth 
had not participated in the attack because they were busy working or feared breaking the 
law. In addition, spoke with some individuals on multiple occasions, thus inflating the total 
number of interviews. (In other words, 111 interviews does not mean 111 people, let alone 
111 different people). I made no attempt to count numbers of youths I spoke with, or who 
were present during group discussions. (See Annex 4 for Contact Chart). 
 
1.7 Unit of analysis 
 The unit of analysis is the case, which has been conceptualized around the combined 
events of the attack on No.11 and the local election campaign. This is justified on the basis 
that the common link is the participation of marginalized and formally unemployed youth. 
Rather than starting with a pre-defined and observable phenomenon, the subject of analysis 
emerged by observing and listening to youth groups and individual youth who were in-
volved in one or both of these events, and by contextualizing this information with historical 
background and analysis of the current political situation, obtained through academic and 
news sources, as well as through interviews with key informants.   
 
1.8 Positionality and my local guide and translator 
 There were multiple risks with regard to positionality that I had to manage during the 
fieldwork, namely my status as a foreign white woman who wanted to talk politics. White 
foreigners are often seen to be representing the aid community, and bringing the promise of 
assistance. After interviews, where young people had given of their time and opened up 
about their suffering, it was common, and reasonable, for them to ask what I would do with 
this information and what power I had to help them.  In addition, being an unaccompanied 
woman in the midst of a of male-dominated youth environment generated another set of 
concerns, not least about personal safety, but also about the way that the interview process 
could be misinterpreted by both subjects and outside observers as interest of a more per-
sonal nature. This had the potential to bias the choice of un/willing respondents, and the in-
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formation they provided. In Koidu, where historically and currently, most foreigners are 
linked to the mining industry, I also had to be aware of actions that could inadvertently pro-
ject this type of association, and to balance these concerns with the need to obtain informa-
tion from the mining company that was the subject of the No.11 attack. Last, and most im-
portantly given the timing, was the politically sensitive nature of the topics of enquiry, and 
the need to make individuals and groups comfortable to talk with a relative degree of free-
dom. In the context of the elections, while some respondents were cautious and could easily 
become defensive with certain lines of questioning, others were more than happy to have an 
ear and a platform for their message. In this context, several saw their involvement in No.11 
as taboo and attenuated their responses accordingly, while others were not in the least bit 
hesitant to discuss their involvement.  
 My initial approach for dealing with many of these issues was somewhat predeter-
mined by my choice of interpreter and main point of contact for the city, a young and out-
spoken female journalist and activist. But working with Sia was one of the most important 
decisions I took, and provided an enriching way of getting to know life in the city through 
the eyes of a local young person who also struggled for her survival. I had been approached 
by her, through a trusted contact within UNDP who had met with youth activists in the area 
and who had given out my contact information at my request. Sia had then approached me 
by email, and I made the decision to work with her in advance, on the basis of her knowl-
edge of the local political players and the initiative she had displayed in contacting me and 
in providing unsolicited and useful information. Sia’s own position carried a mix of risks 
and benefits for my own positioning.  
 As a journalist, Sia had the contacts that enabled me to quickly establish who were 
the initial key informants and gave me access to information that a less engaged person 
would not have been able to provide. At the same time this presented the possibility that in-
formants would feel threatened by the presence of a journalist. We had agreed to monitor 
the situation, and to alter the arrangement if necessary, but in the end there was no evidence 
of such tensions. Importantly, given the timing, Sia was also not a political campaigner, and 
kept her political preferences private. 
 Translation, mainly from Krio, was only necessary while interviewing some of the 
youth, but most of the informants I spoke with had reasonable English. I had maintained it 
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was important though, initially, to have Sia attend the interviews with me, and to allow her 
some freedom in asking questions. I did this because her questions and occasional reactions 
after the interviews often revealed new insights and useful background information. How-
ever, as time went on and my familiarity with people and the situation increased, I began to 
work independently, meeting with her periodically to discuss.      
 As a peer of the youth, and known to many in the central part of the city, Sia pro-
vided an invaluable validation of my presence without which I might never have been able 
to make such advances in the short four weeks that I spent in Koidu. In several cases, gain-
ing acceptance by some of these youth, and particularly by the leaders of these youth groups 
opened the door to talking more freely with their members.  
 In addition to having Sia introduce me into the local setting, I negotiated my position 
in other ways. I aimed to be as transparent as possible about the purpose of research and the 
limits of its impact. I would explain, to informants and whoever asked, about my status as a 
student, and my interest in the youth and how they survive. During the election campaign, I 
discussed with candidates and youth leaders supporting both of the main contending politi-
cal parties. My main mode of transport was by bike or on foot, which distinguished me from 
other commercial and development interests that travelled in marked vehicles, and made my 
activities highly visible.  
 
1.9 Overview of literature 
 Any progress made in the current study is heavily indebted to the wealth of scholarly 
literature on youth, and on the youth culture in Sierra Leone, which formed my point of de-
parture in research. The theoretical framework for this paper focuses on a selection of litera-
ture from the post-war era, in particular the body of ethnographic research exploring the ex-
tent of social transformation as a result of the war, and the position of youth as actors in pre-
sent day Sierra Leone. My analysis draws heavily on the conceptual frameworks of Hon-
wana (2005) and of Vigh (2003). In addition, my understanding of youth culture in Sierra 
Leone builds upon studies by Utas (2007), Christensen and Utas (2008), Bøås (2007), Bøås 
and Hatløy (2006), Richards and Fithen (2005),  Richards (1996, 2005 a,b,c, 2006 a,b), Fan-
thrope (2001, 2003), Peters (2004, 2005, 2006), Rosen (2005), Abdullah (2005), Rashid 
(2005), Coulter (2005), and King (2007). My understanding of patrimonial politics and their 
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interplay with natural resources of the Kono District were informed in particular by Keen 
(2003, 2005), Reno (2003), Jackson (2006), and de Koning (2008).  
 In addition to these sources, I consulted Sierra Leonean newspaper articles for cur-
rent information on unrest in the Kono District. Newspapers in Sierra Leone tend to have 
strong political preferences which biases a great deal of reporting. Furthermore, my access 
to newspapers was difficult in Koidu, where the newspapers were delivered weekly. I tried 
to be conscious of perspectives when utilizing information, and for the most part, utilized 
these articles as a starting point for learning about events and individuals, and for searching 
out further information. 
 
1.10 Interviews 
 Silverman (2003) explains two basic approaches to interviewing. The first is the real-
ist approach, in which the focus is on establishing facts and checking the accuracy of re-
sponses with other methods. In contrast, the narrative approach, “abandons the attempt to 
treat respondent’s account as potentially ‘true’ pictures of ‘reality’ [and] opens up for analy-
sis the culturally rich methods through which interviewers and interviewees, in concert, 
generate plausible accounts of the world”, (Silverman 2003, 343). I applied a combination 
of both approaches. Topical interviews were used to piece together some of the salient facts 
surrounding the attack on the No.11 attack and other story lines, (Rubin & Rubin 1995, 
296). These interviews tended to be more structured, with a list of pre-set questions. I also 
pursued a narrative approach through more open ended interviews, where my main concern 
was to understand the emerging theme of the government of the day as a culturally available 
construct which youth groups employed and shaped to their own meaning, and to explore 
the contradictory feelings of youth in relation to politicians.  
 During the first few weeks I spent a great deal of time speaking to people about the 
elections and the political context in general, as well as observing the election activities and 
their meanings. This meant also speaking with youth groups and civil society organizations 
(CSOs), which played both formal and informal parts in campaigning and in activism for 
peaceful elections. Initially I made no distinction between the youth groups and CSOs, and 
talked to a breadth of actors in an attempt to narrow down a target group. What began to 
emerge was the notion of ‘political youths,’ referring to the youth populating certain com-
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munity youth groups who were heavily involved in campaigning, from informants and reg-
istered CSOs. My interest in these groups was also sparked by one of the earliest interviews 
with the District Chairman of the APC Youth League, who explained that the Vice Presi-
dent had promised that jobs would come to Kono, and that the youth groups falling within 
the League would be the first to benefit.   
 Initially I held group interviews with several of these community youth groups, and 
then, increasingly individually with their members. Focusing on two of the groups in par-
ticular within the middle of Koidu City that do the street cleaning, the Central Youth and the 
Gunpoint Youth (named after their locations), I went to the burned out houses where these 
groups held their meetings, which were more frequent during the campaign period. I also 
held interviews with leaders from three other such groups. In hindsight I should have taken 
a more systematic and focused approach to studying these groups, with more participant ob-
servation, including of their lives outside of these meetings.  
 Meeting with groups in their official capacity influenced the type of responses and 
the dynamic of interviews. I had an interest not only in their development activities, but also 
in the less legitimate political activities they were said to pursue. However, I quickly learned 
that broaching these questions directly made groups defensive, and that a better route was 
asking whether they had been approached by politicians. Groups were far more comfortable 
discussing their aspirations, and hopes for employment and project support. They were also 
very open about their feelings of frustration and exploitation on behalf of politicians.  
 The ice was often broken during these group meetings, and in the days and weeks 
afterwards, individual members were often happy to meet privately. With individual inter-
views, I would often ask respondents if they would like to meet at a given public location in 
the downtown, and whenever possible, I would make a point of offering a drink to relax the 
atmosphere and in appreciation for their time. Occasionally I would meet with respondents 
after working hours, when they returned from the mines, in which case we would continue 
with interviews by flashlight. 
 In addition to meeting with youth groups and individual youths involved in cam-
paigning and the No.11 attack, I met with other individuals and groups with alternative per-
spectives from the marginalized political youth that I focused on. Meeting with chiefdom 
elders, politicians and candidates, the Tankoro police, the District Magistrate, and represen-
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tatives of Kariba Kono Ltd. helped to fill in gaps, and to establish story lines about No.11 
and incidents of electoral violence. These additional interviews and conversations were also 
significant in establishing who exactly these political youth were. By speaking with regis-
tered CSOs with a youth and social justice focus, what became clear was a large discrep-
ancy in leadership, management, planning, networking, and resource mobilization capaci-
ties, as well as the educational attainment (including professional development) of the lead-
ers of these groups in comparison to the less formal community youth groups. In addition, 
brief conversations with young people sampled by convenience, normally while working 
(repairing tires in the central car park, trading in the market, working in shops, returning 
from mining sites, riding bikes) also helped to build this picture by explaining their reasons 
for non-involvement in campaign activities and in the attack on No.11 by way of their em-
ployment and therefore their reluctance to become involved in activities that were associ-
ated with lawbreaking. 
 I made the decision not to use a tape recorder for several reasons. Because the nature 
of the research was predominantly exploratory, and because I relied primarily on interviews 
as my source of information, the volume of interviews I foresaw was large. Given that I 
only had the period during my fieldwork to do any transcribing, there was a tradeoff be-
tween depth and covering more ground. Instead, I took thorough notes of conversations, 
quoting respondents as much as possible, which I would re-write while things were fresh in 
my mind. Secondly, a recorder was not useful for group conversations and would make dis-
tinguishing voices and what was said difficult. Note-taking was also potentially less threat-
ening given the occasionally sensitive nature of what was being discussed, and would keep 
respondents more relaxed. The tradeoff was my own ability to listen attentively and ask 
questions while writing, but with practice I improved.  
 
1.12 Observation  
 I mixed interviews with direct and participant observation. Being in Koidu during the 
campaign enabled me to witness some of the formal and informal election activities and 
phenomena, including political and peace rallies, the predominance of APC party branding 
throughout the city, the elections themselves, and the activity around group meeting places. 
With an interest in establishing the claims of several community youth groups disputing al-
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legations that they were merely campaign groups, I continued to return to their meeting 
places after the elections and found them to be empty most of the time, regardless of time of 
day. The activity surrounding these meeting places dropped off significantly after the elec-
tions, with several exceptions.    
 Street cleaning activities, taking place the last Saturday of the month across the city, 
brought youth out onto the streets of their respective communities, to shovel out the refuse 
from ditches. These street cleaning groups normally set up barricades to slow the traffic, and 
encourage passers by to make a contribution, some more forcefully than others.  Another 
time, I was making regular visits to the meeting place of one youth group after the elections, 
only to find at the end of the week, one evening where members descended on the place af-
ter nightfall to sell and smoke marijuana. Meeting groups in these circumstances often led to 
more natural conversations, while at the same time providing a better understanding of some 
of the ways they found to survive and socialize.  
  I conducted several site visits, including of the No.11 site, in order to understand the 
space where the attack had taken place, and the distances covered by youth who travelled to 
the sand and back into the city. I also visited an agricultural land reclamation site, a project 
by a youth CSOs, to get a sense of how their activities were organized in comparison to the 
community youth groups which aspired to similar and even larger scale projects.  
 
1.13 Materials collected from groups 
 A recurring theme in conversations with youth groups was their expectation of jobs 
from the ruling government that would come with new APC local council representatives. 
Several community groups and one trade association mentioned the fact that they were de-
veloping project proposals as well as writing letters to influential elders and politicians in 
order to request jobs. Few groups had actually produced such letters, but I was able to ob-
tain copies, addressed to various senior politicians and officials, from one group which re-
quest “employment facilities.” These copies corroborated the expectation of patron-client 
relations in the wake of the local elections, which had emerged in interviews, (Annex 2). 





1.14 Research ethics 
 This study employed a utilitarian approach to research ethics, which judges actions 
according to the specific benefits and costs they incur for the individuals involved and af-
fected. According to this framework, the standards for ethical recruitment, fieldwork and 
reporting phases of research are informed consent, avoidance of harm, and confidentiality, 
respectively, (Huberman & Miles 1994, 290).  
 Ethical recruitment requires the informed and voluntary consent of research subjects. 
In qualitative studies, where the process and outcome of research the may only be vaguely 
determined, it may not be possible for participants to be fully informed. (Huberman & Miles 
1994, 291). It is therefore important to provide the option to withdraw from the study at any 
point, (Lunde 2006, 17). Although I had prepared written consent forms, explaining the 
purpose of my research, I only used them infrequently. Most of my youth respondents had 
low literacy, and there were many situations where written consent seemed too formalistic 
in any event. I prefaced formal interviews with a verbal explanation of my status as a uni-
versity student, and the focus of my research, and the final output. Other times, where a cas-
ual conversation led to useful information, I would explain my purpose and ask for permis-
sion afterwards. Unfortunately I had not fully internalized the practical implications of  be-
ing systematic in conducting ethical research, and although I had provided my contact de-
tails on the consent forms, at the beginning I was not so conscious of the need to be explicit 
in explaining to participants their right to withdraw from the study. In practice however, I 
assume they knew if they did not have my number, that they could easily contact Sia.  
 The tradeoff of being visible (e.g. holding interviews in public places) and transpar-
ent was that my interest in politics and No.11 became known, and, together with the prox-
imity of the elections, would occasionally raise suspicions. The risk for my informants was 
that by speaking with me this could send a message that they were interested in politics, and 
that more politically vocal youths would be more likely to discuss.  
 Not all of my informants were equally vulnerable. In a context where APC support 
dominated, those with minority views who were not actively running for office were careful 
not to express those views in public. Predicting these situations was not possible, neither 
was it always possible to move to a private location without indicating views an informant 
might prefer to keep private. It was generally difficult obtaining privacy when talking to 
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youth members of organizations while they were on duty. The situation arose at several 
junctures that individuals either were asked by leaders to talk, or volunteered, but did not 
appear comfortable. I did not press these individuals about their views, unless it was clear 
that they wanted to express them, in which case we would pursue the conversation else-
where or at another time.   
 Confidentiality in this study was of particular importance given the sensitive nature 
of some of the discussions. None of my respondents ever asked me to reference them 
anonymously, however, with some exceptions, I do not believe that any of them provided 
information they were not willing to share publicly or that was not already public knowl-
edge. As a precaution, however, I have decided not to name any respondents.  
 Closely linked is the issue of identifiability, which is a concern for respondents hold-
ing official or informal leadership positions and individuals with prominent local reputa-
tions. Where this issue has arisen in presenting the data, my general approach has been to 
report only what is already public knowledge, and to source it if the source the data if this 
too is public knowledge. Several individuals in the study are identifiable, however their po-
sitions and roles within events were well known.  
 For example, despite the fact that most youth groups would strenuously dispute any 
labels of ‘being political’, my analysis draws out certain contradictions between their words 
and their actions. Some of these groups were, at the time, pursuing formal registration as 
CSOs, which would entitle them to apply for funding and bank accounts. These had to meet 
a criterion of political neutrality, (Ministry of Social Welfare [Interview 51]). Information to 
the contrary I feared could have implications for their chances of obtaining this formalized 
status. However, the fact that the Ministries of Social Welfare and of Youth and Sports have 
established processes for determining eligibility which include a probationary period where 
their activities are monitored, combined with the fact that most local individuals I spoke 
with had already formed opinions about the groups in question, has led me to decide to 
name these organizations. In addition, I state clearly that, regardless of the fact that it was 
not possible to determine definitively the extent to which groups actually were “political” or 
not, it was not my purpose to categorize groups in this manner, but simply to try to under-
stand the meaning of such labels in context.  
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 Many youth were happy to discuss their views and their involvement, and to be taken 
seriously about their challenges and aspirations. One of the most repeated questions respon-
dents had for me was what would happen with all the information they were providing, in 
terms of its productive use in promoting their cause. Reciprocity in research is by some es-
timations more important than informed consent, (Wax, 1982, cited in Huberman & Miles 
1994, 291). There was an inherent imbalance in those benefiting from this research.  Indi-
viduals, most of whom had had their education disrupted, were helping me to obtain a de-
gree. In return, I was giving them a chance to be heard, and maybe a drink they could not 
easily have gotten themselves. I made a point of managing expectations from the outset, ex-
plaining that any benefits this research might incur would be indirect and long term. This 
hardly seemed satisfactory, so I undertook to make an abbreviated version of the paper 
available, and if of sufficient quality, to write a short article for awareness-raising purposes.  
 
1.9 Validity, generalisability and reliability 
 Qualitative research aims to understand how phenomena are understood by those be-
ing studied, rather than to impose categories of meaning on objects and events. Validity in 
qualitative research therefore refers not to the scientific rigour of research design or data 
collection processes that precedes statistical generalizations, but to the inferences that can 
be drawn from the accounts of individuals, groups, phenomena, etc., (Maxwell cited in 
Huberman & Miles 2002, 42). The qualitative researcher has a duty to demonstrate that ob-
jects and their local meanings are accurately apprehended in order to make plausible theo-
retical propositions and explanations.   
 Maxwell distinguishes several layers of validity which help in breaking down the po-
tential threats to validity that can arise in the course of research. The first level is descriptive 
validity. This refers to the “factual accuracy of [an] account, ” which can be directly ob-
served, or inferred from other information sources, (Maxwell cited in Huberman & Miles 
2002, 45). While I was able to directly observe some of the election activity and embedded 
discourse, I was not present at the time of the attack on No.11, and so was only able to infer 
events from interviews with participants and outside observers. Discrepancy between ac-
counts, particularly statistically descriptive aspects, for instance the estimated numbers of 
youth involved, could not always be verified. However, achieving this level of accuracy did 
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not affect the ability to identify meaning or to draw inferences. Events that were repeated by 
different groups of youth and the company were taken to be significant, and shaped the 
composite story line, such as the promise by the vice president, and a provocative statement 
by an SLPP member, to name a few. Some of these facts were confirmed in newspaper arti-
cles. The “facts” being established were not always about events, but also about intangible 
beliefs and opinions, such as their grievances against the SLPP party, and the belief that po-
litical connections were necessary for social advancement. I tended to ask about these di-
rectly, and also to contextualize these statements with my own observations. 
   In addition to establishing factual accounts, I had to try to understand the meanings 
of different facts from the perspective of my informants, what Maxwell calls “interpretive 
validity”, (Maxwell cited in Huberman & Miles 2002, 48). A good example of a potential 
threat to validity was the significance of No.11 to the youth involved in the attack. When I 
realized that I had assumed that most youth were aware of the illegality of their actions, I 
added new questions and was able to establish a more nuanced account, involving different 
levels of awareness. For the local leaders, the attack was political exactly because of the re-
strictions to their access, while others also politically, asserted emphatically that the sand 
belonged to the youth. Still others, I had been told, had come from further afield, under the 
misapprehension that the sand had now been given to the youth. Similarly, the significance 
of the phrase the government of the day, emerged not only from the words and actions of 
youth groups around the local elections, but also from speaking with several chiefs and 
through background reading on the chieftaincy system which indicated a pre-existing con-
ceptual framework that youth groups were building upon.  
 As Silverman states, the overriding concern is understanding how groups depict real-
ity through narratives, rather than establishing accuracy, (Silverman 2003, 348). Part of my 
task was squaring narratives of exploitation of youth by politicians with the ample evidence 
that most of these same youth were strong supporters of the current government. I organised 
the material with categories created by participants. Themes emerged of support and sub-
version that were in evidence in the discourse and in the actions taken and described by 
youth. Some such as the government of the day emerged directly from the words used by the 
youth, and resonated more broadly with their actions of support, while others were more de-
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scriptive of general attitudes and opinions. Though some interviews were more topical and 
others narrative, in practice, accounts of fact and meaning were often blended. 
 In addition to attempting to comprehend the situation of my youth informants from 
their perspective, I also applied an exogenous theoretical construction to explain the per-
spectives of the youth. In particular, what this theory helped to explain was the incongru-
ence in the past and present behaviours and (present) discourse of youth. According to 
Maxwell:  
... theoretical validity... depends on whether there is consensus within the 
community concerned with the research about the terms used to character-
ize the phenomena,” (Maxwell cited in Huberman & Miles 2002, 52). 
 
While at no point did informants employ the terminology of “patron” or “client” or 
“agency”, many youth described their personal and group situations in terms of opportuni-
ties and constraints which connected to political factors. This tended to be framed in terms 
of exclusion (when discussing the previous SLPP regime) and hope for inclusion (when dis-
cussing the APC party). The combination of both Honwana’s conceptual dichotomy of stra-
tegic and tactical agency, and Vigh’s social navigation held explanatory value for the ac-
tions of youth, while the concept of patrimonialism helped to enlighten the networking 
pathways that were opened up at election time, as well as the patterns of exclusion which 
they had described.  
 The findings of single case studies can be generalized, not to wider universes on the 
basis of representative sampling, but analytically, based on the relevance of a theory to simi-
lar populations or situations, (Yin 1994, 36; Maxwell cited in Huberman & Miles 2002, 53). 
I argue that the finding that patrimonialism continues to shape and to limit the political en-
gagement of marginalized youth applies beyond those youth I saw in Kono, to the many 
youth with the same lack of livelihood, educational and other opportunities for social ad-
vancement.  Yin adds that generalization is “not automatic” and must be “tested through 
replication,” (Yin 1994, 36). The current proposition builds on other research that has estab-
lished the persistence of patrimonial dynamics in mobilising youth during the 2007 General 
Election (e.g. Christensen & Utas 2008). However, further testing is required to see whether 
the claim that patrimonial imperatives limit the agency of youth, holds explanatory value in 
other situations.    
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 Finally, I have attempted to maximize the transparency and replicability of this study 
with comprehensive documenting of conversations, careful notation within transcripts of 
assumed meanings and researcher’s notes (indicated with double brackets [[..]]), a field 
notebook illustrating the evolution of categories, and a log of conversations including dates, 
location, how the informant was accessed, and key themes. Allowing for the fact that the 
present colours how one speaks of the past, a researcher who wanted to retrace the steps of 
this study would likely find at least the same factual accounts, and the same range of mean-
ing accorded to those facts, and while other inferences might also be drawn, those made in 
the present study would be found to be reasonable, on the basis of the analysis that follows.  
 
1.15 Outline 
 The next chapter sets out the conceptual and theoretical framework on youth agency 
and patrimonialism that is applied in analyzing the findings. Chapter three gives historical 
background on the grievances held by youth leading to the war, the history of mineral ex-
ploitation and political interference in Kono District. It also looks at the situation of youth 
since the end of the war, including relevant governance reforms, and explores the question 
of whether their agency has been enhanced. It finally explains the significance of the 2008 
Local Council Election in Kono. Chapter four presents and then analyses the story of the 
No.11 attack and the subsequent actions and discourse of youth which followed several 
months later during the local election.  Chapter six concludes and explores implications and 
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2. Conceptual and theoretical framework 
 
 When they realized the government had broken its promise to them of distributing 
the sand, after the opposition party MP had said as much on the radio, the leaders among 
them decided to claim their rights and to force the accountability of the party in one bold 
act. Hundreds came, and their numbers multiplied, some estimated up to more than a thou-
sand. They trespassed onto the No.11 site and began to take the sand, carrying it away 
where they could wash it for diamonds. Lest their message be misinterpreted, one of them 
carried a red flag and planted it at the top of the towering dune, as testimony of their rightful 
claim. The order had soon been sent for some of the local chiefs to meet with the company 
and to try to negotiate. For a few brief days, they seemed to be winning. But behind closed 
doors, the party was realizing there was no room for compromise with the company that le-
gally owned the rights to reprocessing the tailings.  Several days after they had begun the 
strike, the police and army arrived.  
   At first glance, the present case could be read as an empowered group of youths 
who are breaking with traditional norms of subservience to authority, and, to some extent, 
this may be the case. But taken within its political setting, this conclusion does not fit. Two 
months later, these same youth who had been among those to consciously break the law and 
to risk angering both the government and the company, had become the most loyal support-
ers of the APC party, and of Vice President Sam Sumana in particular, as evidenced by their 
discourse on the government of the day.  Taken together, I argue that these seemingly con-
tradictory behaviours represent the limits of youth agency in the face of enduring patrimo-
nial power. The theoretical framework that is put forward in this chapter, by making the link 
between individual agency and patrimonial social structures, helps to clarify this argument.  
 
2.2 Patrimonialism 
         Patron-client relations are by definition unequal. Bangura defines patrimonialism as:  
A system of resource distribution that ties recipients or clients to the 
strategic goals of benefactors or patrons. In the distribution of ‘patri-
mony’, or public resources, both patrons and clients attach more im-
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portance to personal loyalties than to the bureaucratic rules that should 
otherwise govern the allocation of such resources, (Bangura 1997, 130 
cited in Vigh 2007).   
 
Within government, this translates into a blurring of public and private spheres. In neopat-
rimonial regimes, norms of “bureaucratic rationality,” which are defined by impersonal and 
rules-based management of public goods, coexist alongside patrimonial norms and informal 
practices that personalize the redistribution of public resources, (Bøås & Dunn 2008, 22). 
Politics is informalised and acted out through vertically linked patron-client exchange-based 
relations, and legitimacy of the state is closely tied to redistribution, (Chabal & Daloz 
1999).  
 On the client side, patrimonial networks can both privilege and marginalize. Many 
youth find it impossible to advance socially without the direct or indirect assistance of such 
contacts. The benefits of being connected to a well-positioned patron can include anything 
from basic sustenance, to jobs, education, political influence and the ability to sustain one’s 
own patronage network. In the Kono District, the connection between youth, local patrons 
and ones within the central government is linked to the power these patrons hold over the 
distribution of mining licenses, land, jobs within the kimberlite (deep rock) mining industry, 
and other resources which constitute the essential elements for livelihood and social mobil-
ity, (Reno 2003). Ultimately, when income-generating opportunities are acutely limited, as 
they are for poor youth in Sierra Leone, attachment to a patron may be the only viable way 
of improving one’s social prospects (most other means only providing basic survival).   
 The benefits of patrimonialism are exclusive. Youth who cannot manage to advance 
themselves within existing networks, or who are shed off of contracting networks, must turn 
to outside options to survive and to have a chance to become somebody in society. This may 
increasingly be through peer associations, but often also involves seeking new patrons, 
whenever the opportunity arises. There are several times when broader networks absorb 
new youth. In what Vigh refers to as the militarization of patrimonial politics, in times of 
conflict, previously marginalized youth form a willing pool of recruits for warlords, serving 
military objectives in exchange for patronage and the chance to realize dreams of social be-
coming, (Vigh 2007). Similarly, elections, as times of political uncertainty and jockeying 
for power, open up recruitment avenues for young people who seek benefits by supporting 
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politicians, (Utas 2007). As a result, patrimonial allegiance is frequently the modus operandi 
of political engagement of marginalized youth who seek to be on the inside of such net-
works. 
 
2.2 Tactical and strategic agency 
 A useful framework for understanding the power of marginalized youth in relation to 
political patrons has been developed by Alcinda Honwana. She applies dual concepts of tac-
tical and strategic agency to understanding how child soldiers, as actors who are frequently 
forced into dangerous roles, and who have little or no choice in their actions, find ways to 
exercise power from a “position of weakness”, (Honwana 2005, 49). On the battlefield, a 
child soldier must continuously negotiate his survival, seizing opportunities as they present 
themselves. The child combatant may still exercise agency from this position by tactically 
manipulating rules and structures as opportunities arise, for example, feigning ignorance, 
“pretending to be ill”, or “planning an escape”, (Honwana 2005, 48). This “tactical agency”, 
she quotes, is ‘the art of the weak’, (de Certeau, cited in Honwana 2005, 48,49) in the sense 
that these actors operate within a terrain that is characterized by a high degree of insecurity, 
in which their space to manoeuver is limited. The battlefield example suggests myopic vi-
sion, looking only as far as the next position of relative security, whereby the agent may not 
be aware of the longer term consequences of his/her actions, let alone able to select and 
connect these actions to achieve ultimate goals.   
 Strategic agency, in contrast, involves partly the capability to set longer-term goals 
and to take calculated actions that will lead to their eventual achievement. Strategy, in its 
military sense, she explains, involves:  
the calculation or manipulation of relationships or force that becomes possible as 
soon as a subject of will and power, such as an army, can be isolated from an en-
vironment. A strategy ‘assumes a place that can be circumscribed as “proper” 
(propre) and thus serve as the basis for generating relations with an exterior dis-
tinct from it (competitors, adversaries), (Certeau, cited in Honwana 2005, 49).  
 
This space which the agent creates is isolated from the threat of immediate physical incur-
sion, and provides the room to strategize - to evaluate risks, and plan a course of action to 
reach a given goal. Actions taken on this basis are carefully thought through, with the agent 
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exercising greater control. This isolated and adequately-resourced space, or ‘proper’, which 
forms the power base of strategic agency, is absent in tactical agency.  
 Vigh (2003), also drawing on de Certeau (1984), clarifies an important dimension in 
the relationship between tactical and strategic agency, in his development of the concept of 
social navigation. Strategic agency indicates one’s ability to demarcate this space, or terrain, 
for the purpose of attaining a given military or political object, for instance. In contrast, tac-
tical agency draws upon the “symbolic, cultural or economic resources” at one’s disposal to 
navigate an unstable terrain that is constituted by others, in order to enhance one’s position 
and “strategic possibilities,” (Vigh 2003, 137). While the resources empowering them dif-
fer, both agencies involve enhancing one’s position. Neither form indicates a permanently 
weak or powerful position. Rather, agents move dynamically between degrees of agency as 
they shift between domains. While an agent may assert his authority in a private domain he 
has constituted, he may lack this power in the public domain, seeking it through continuous 
identification and exploitation of opportunities, (Vigh 2003 140-141). In other words, the 
process of “social becoming” and the empowerment this brings can be thought of as the 
navigation from a position of limited and dependent tactical agency to one of self-contained 
strategic agency.  
 Determining whether youth discourse and actions exhibit tactical or strategic is con-
sidered central in monitoring and assessing the extent to which their agency is increasing, 
and whether or not they are becoming “empowered”.  
 
2.3 Integrating tactical and strategic agency with patrimonialism 
 Given the salience of patrimonial structures in both marginalizing and creating op-
portunities for youth, their relationship to youth agency and empowerment warrants further 
reflection. Drawing on work done by Vigh (2003), this paper integrates Honwana’s concep-
tual dichotomy with patrimonialism as a system in order to help to analyze not only the ex-
tent of youth aspirations, but also the degree to which youth act with reference to patronage 
as a source of objective constraints and opportunities. In so doing, it can help to clarify the 
circumstances of genuine empowerment, and to identify instances where, perhaps despite 
appearances to the contrary, youth agency remains constrained by dependency upon pa-
trons.  
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 As the above definition of patrimonialism by Bangura indicates, the client is tied to 
the strategic goals of the patron. Relations between patron and client are therefore, by defi-
nition, ones of superior and subordinate. In Honwana’s terms, the position of the patron is 
essentially strategic, while that of the client is essentially tactical. The social contract be-
tween client and patron is one of asymmetric reciprocity. Clients find themselves within a 
position of dependency on the patron much more than the reverse is true. Patrons set the 
principal objectives and rules of engagement, and as a result, they exercise a degree of con-
trol over the actions of the client that is not reciprocated. Although clients do possess re-
sources that allow them to exercise some influence on the realization of the strategic objec-
tives of patrons, this is normally done within the framework of rules that favour the patron.  
 Take the example of an election. The victory of politicians (patrons) in an election 
relies on the capacity of youth (clients), collectively, to mobilize voters. Similarly, clients 
may depend upon patrons for benefits, whether short term personal gains such as one-off 
payments or jobs, or longer term collective rewards, such as better roads and educational 
opportunities. Just as patrons will court the vote of their supporters during a campaign, cli-
ents may seek to demonstrate their loyalty and usefulness. One also expects that they will 
act with a view to preserving the relationship, or at least avoiding measures that might jeop-
ardize it, for as long as they depend on patrons for these benefits. 
 Following a victory, there is no expectation from clients of an equal division of bene-
fits, though the situation on both sides is expected to improve, even if only in the long term. 
Benefits accruing to clients are secondary, in sequence, after the strategic objective of elec-
toral victory for the patron. While clients play a crucial role in the attainment of this victory, 
they have little direct control over the realization of promised material and social benefits 
once the election is over, and therefore depend on the good faith of patrons to fulfill their 
side of the contract. An important distinction between positions is that, although the patron 
cannot engineer a victory without his/her troops, he/she normally ceases to require the sup-
port of clients after being voted into office. Therefore while there is still an obligation to-
wards clients, the client has no leverage over this secondary objective, outside of other ex-
isting mechanisms for holding the patron accountable. The client is essentially in a tactical 
position, by virtue of the need to adjust expectations and to direct behaviours/actions toward 
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attaining the strategic objective of the patron, while being in a position of prolonged de-
pendency on the patron for the fulfillment of electoral promises.  
 Despite their predominantly tactical position of during elections, youth continue to 
exercise their agency in opportunistic and manipulative ways, by undermining rules and 
norms. Vigh (2003) observes, in a patrimonial context, youth are conscious of both “the 
immediate and the imagined” as they navigate “networks and events”. They are highly 
aware of current opportunities and constraints, while building contingencies into their plans 
for shifting configurations of power, (Vigh 2003, 142). The practice of watermelon politics 
in the 2007 General Election, where many youth broke social norms of reciprocity by ac-
cepting benefits from one party, but voting for another, reveals and agency that is quintes-
sentially tactical in its shrewd manipulation of political circumstances to extract benefits.  
 Youth, by the social moratorium that defines their position, aspire to strategic 
agency. Although it is less feasible for them to exercise it within society, than within aspects 
of their personal lives and relationships which they can control, but it is not impossible. 
Strategic agency normally characterizes the position of patron, but it can also be established 
outside of the patrimonial terrain. It can manifest itself as the socio-economic independence 
that insulates clients from reliance on patronage, and therefore from the power relations en-
tailed.  In this instance, the proper is anchored in resources that provide alternative means of 
achieving goals, such as direct access to donor funding for projects, or a livelihood. Alterna-
tively, strategic agency might manifest itself as the ability to shape the societal space within 
which patrons operate, and thereby to influence their choices  and actions. For example, 
formal processes that protect and promote the right of youth constituencies to equal partici-
pation in societal decision-making, or effective accountability mechanisms that youth can 
inform, can increase their leverage after elections. In the absence of such channels, youth 
may also exercise strategic agency by utilising their resources, such as collective action or 
the threat of violence, to reverse the normal balance of power between patron and client, 
and thereby to influence or even compel certain outcomes. Such actions, which risk damag-
ing relationships with patrons, highlight the gulf between this level of independence, and the 
tactical agent who seeks, at a minimum, to preserve his relation with the patron. An example 
of this type of strategic agency is the practice of “watermelon tricks” in the 2007 General 
Election, whereby ex-combatants on the “politician patrol” attempted to redefine their rela-
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tions with patrons, by coercing them to act in line with their own objectives. They did this 
by utilising the symbolic value of their feared image to intimidate and extort money from 
political big men, (Christensen & Utas 2008). The potential to backfire means that such ac-
tions would not be taken under circumstances of strict dependency upon patrons.  
 Patron client relations are complex, in that an agent may be both a patron and a re-
cipient of patronage (a client) at the same time. As a patron, he/she may exercise strategic 
agency over the labour market that his/her patronage creates, by marshaling supporters to 
achieve his/her political goals. At the same time, the is dependent upon the continuous flow 
of patronage that empowers him/her to maintain such a network. Access to patronage for 
redistribution is therefore a significant resource that underpins the strategic agency to shape 
the political terrain. 
 Given the lack of effective formal channels for marginalized youth to influence deci-
sions and actors the public sphere, strategic agency can either be established through co-
optation into the patrimonial system (new patrons are made), or outside the system, through 
disengagement due to socio-economic independence, or by challenging existing power rela-
tionships and resource (re)distribution. 
 
2.4 Applying the framework 
 Having a framework for determining, broadly, types (or levels) of youth agency 
might make it possible to monitor change in the agency of differentiated youth groups over 
time. It could also provide a basis for operationalising vague notions of youth empowerment 
which constitute an objective of many youth policies and programmes.   
 The framework is applied by analyzing specific events, acts and patterns of behav-
iour  of youth in the public sphere, rather than for categorizing groups of individuals, whose 
agencies are context-specific and dynamic.  It begins by asking one overarching question:  
Do youth exercise their agency in a tactical or strategic manner?  
Answering this question requires understanding what motivates certain actions, and the pat-
rimonial context within which they are executed.  
 Where youth are socially and economically marginalised, there tends to be a dis-
course of exploitation, injustice and entitlement. This is often directed, to a lesser of greater 
extent, towards figureheads of the establishment that oppresses them, such as politicians, 
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authority figures and corporate actors. In such a context, one indicator of strategic agency 
might include subversive or vigilante action, taken to redress rights and claim entitlements, 
which risks damaging relations with patrons. Alternatively, it may be reflected in less con-
frontational ways, such as the ability to influence societal decisions on equal footing with 
non-youth politicians, elders and authority figures, or the ability to carve out and grow 
socio-economic spaces that are protected from patrimonial interference. In general, strategic 
actions that are not embedded within patrimonialism should be characterized by behavioural 
and rhetorical consistency that reveals commitment to social justice as a principle of gov-
ernance, rather than as a particularist outcome. 
 Given the assumption that the agency that clients exercise in relation to patrons is in-
herently tactical, an indicator of tactical agency is the pervasive belief, among youth, that 
favourable positioning vis-a-vis patrons is needed for social advancement. This may be ex-
pressed by actions and discourse that are highly supportive of patrons, and may be rein-
forced by evidence that such support is undermined by mistrust, or driven by a lack of alter-
natives. Either of these features may reveal a position of reluctant dependency.    
 Based on this understanding, certain sub-questions have been devised to guide the 
case analysis, and to identify the type of agency revealed in the case: 
• Was the action initiated and led by youth or by patrons? 
• Were actions and behaviours intended to strengthen relations with patrons, or did they 
risk damaging them?
 
• What likelihood is there of aspirations attached to this action/behaviour being fulfilled? 
• Do youth exhibit consistency with their support or opposition to patrons? 
• If not, how is inconsistency explained? 
• To what extent have power relationships in the public domain been altered by events?  
 
 





 To understand the current narratives of exploitation and aspiration of youth, it is nec-
essary to appreciate how they are anchored in a longer history of exclusion and exploitation. 
This chapter does not attempt to replicate histories of state making, war and settlement, but 
discusses aspects of these processes that have impacted on youth grievances and agency 
over the years. Section one begins how the grievances of youth contributed to the war, fol-
lowed by a description of the fighters and their motivations. The subject of rural grievances, 
and the historic linkages to governance processes and their exclusionary impact on rural 
youth in particular is considered in greater detail in section three. Section four focuses on 
Kono, and the historic relation between mining, governance and the mobilisation of young 
“strangers” in the district. Sections five and six consider the post-war youth employment 
challenge, and several local governance reforms that impact on the grievances of youth. 
Section seven explores several studies of youth behaviour and organization since the end of 
the war and considers how the social change brought by war and recovery has impacted 
youth agencies. The last section provides the political background for understanding the 
significance of the 2008 local elections in Kono. 
 
3.1 Youth alienation and the war 
 At the core of the civil war was the breakdown of the state, from its kleptocratic cen-
tre, to its unaccountable peripheries. State failure was accelerated by economic factors: the 
global and domestic economic crisis of the 1970s, the distortions of neoliberal policies im-
posed by international financiers, and the drying up of aid with the end of the Cold War. 
The neopatrimonial state became increasingly expensive to run. Although youth were not 
the only group impacted, the conditions produced within the domestic political climate and 
economy had particular implications for them. The conditions alienated young people by 
damaging their educational, employment, and social prospects. The opposition that arose in 
these circumstances was informal, and rooted in a university and dropout urban class.  
 The grievances at the heart of the war, Keen argues,  
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[...] reflect the mode of development in Sierra Leone, which under British 
rule was based on the extraction of unprocessed raw materials such as iron, 
diamonds, and a variety of agricultural products, (Keen 2003, 69). 
 
The emphasis on extractive-oriented resource generation, at the expense of local develop-
ment and economic stimulation, continued after independence in 1961, as politicians 
adopted patronage-based strategies of rule. These strategies prepared the way for predatory 
resource exploitation and violent conflict, (Reno 2003).  
 With the discovery of diamonds in 1930, the economy became geared towards min-
eral extraction, with diamonds as the primary export. Mining trade unionism emerged as a 
new force in provincial politics, and Siaka Stevens, a trade union leader with an Oxford 
education from the trade union college, headed the newly formed APC party. He was 
elected in 1967 on a socialist ticket, defeating its mother Sierra Leone People’s Party 
(SLPP), itself dominated by conservative provincial elite from the predominantly Mende 
South-East region. The new party evoked the socialist tradition of Wallace Johnson’s Youth 
League, and attracted support from youth in more remote and predominantly Temne north-
ern districts (Richards 1996, 40). But this egalitarian ideology was superficial. Stevens con-
solidated and personalized his grip on power by intimidating and co-opting opponents, by 
gagging the press, and by buying off senior members of the civil service, the army and the 
police, (Keen 2003,1). By the 1977 elections when SLPP chose not to run, the country had 
become a de facto one party state, and by 1978, a one party state was declared (Abdullah 
2004, 43). Stevens treated the country’s natural resource revenue as a source of personal 
wealth, colluding with private sector mining interests to undervalue exports and share rents. 
High level corruption trickled down to the administrative level as loss of revenue affected 
the ability to fund public sector employment, leading bureaucrats and other public sector 
workers to compensate by other means for their lack of salaries, further weakening the ca-
pacity of the state to harness resources and to suppress illegal economic activity. Smuggling 
became endemic, and by the late 1980s it was estimated that 95 percent of diamonds left the 
country this way, (Keen 2003, 76).  
 It was not until the 1970s and 1980s that the mantle of informal opposition was taken 
up by radical student groups from Freetown Universities, notably from the Fourah Bay Col-
lege. These drew inspiration from pan-Africanism, the Libyan leader Gadaffi’s Green Book, 
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and the legacy of “veteran radical” I.T.A . Wallace Johnson, (Richards 1996, 53). The co-
hort to which these radical students belonged differed from ones of the past, in that most 
youth had attained some level of primary and secondary education, with corresponding 
higher levels of literacy and of political awareness. Many within this group were forced to 
drop out, and were unable to find jobs in the rapidly contracting public and private sectors. 
Under these circumstances, solidarity grew between radical students and the youth under-
class of labourers and dropouts, generating common anti-social language and practices that 
gave expression to their political frustrations and hopes, (Abdullah 2004). A period of 
youth-government confrontations started in 1977, when student protests against Stevens met 
a brutal counter-demonstration by the APC Youth League backed up by the President’s pa-
ramilitary Internal Security Unit. The ensuing anti-APC protest movement spread around 
the city and ended with the death of 40 people, (Rashid 2004, 75). This had been a signifi-
cant attempt by the youth to carve out a strategic enclave from which to challenge the injus-
tice of the exclusive and repressive patrimonial system.  
 The economy went into steep decline in the 1980s, due to a combination of factors, 
including a dramatic drop in mining revenue and in the price of raw materials. Public sector 
retrenchment prescribed by economic restructuring of the World Bank, in combination with 
the shortfall in resources, created a crisis of patrimonialism that badly affected the legiti-
macy of the state, causing then President, General Momoh, to organize a referendum on 
multiparty elections by the early 1990s, (Richards 1996, 41). Rampant corruption damaged 
the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of those who did not benefit from patrimonial net-
works but who depended on its services. Spending on education plummeted, and by 1987, 
less than 30 percent of those of a secondary school age were attending school, (Keen 2003, 
80). Justice became commodified, and chiefdom authorities, the guardians of customary lo-
cal rights and dispensaries of law and order could purchase their titles. 
 
3.2 Who fought, and why 
 The war against the state broke out on two fronts: on the border, where the Liberian-
sponsored Revolutionary United Front (RUF) led a small invasion in 1991, and in the capi-
tal, in an entirely separate coup by the neglected military, which formed a National Provi-
sional Ruling Council (NPRC) in 1992. These strikes can be interpreted as acts of collective 
  
 43 
strategic agency by youth that had exhausted the limits of tactical agency. War had become, 
for the initial recruits, a preferable and more viable option to social improvement.  
 Abdullah et.al (2004) have disputed the intellectual origins of the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) as the basis for understanding the logic of its brutal character, argued 
by Richards (1996). They assert that the nature of the war is better understood by the social 
character of the movement, and that while the intellectual origins of the RUF drew upon this 
heritage of the critical student-led militancy, this educated leadership parted ways with an 
undisciplined “lumpen” element that went on to form the initial cadre and recruitment pool 
of the insurgency.  Others have objected to the implication of an inherently violent lumpen 
youth culture as explanation for the brutal character of the war, and have sought instead to 
understand the motivations of voluntary recruitment, (Fanthorpe 2001; Peters 2004; Rich-
ards 2005; Bøås & Dunn 2007).  
 The war began in March 1991, with the invasion of about a hundred guerilla fighters 
from Liberia. The RUF force grew rapidly with a mixture of coerced and voluntary recruit-
ment. Abdullah et.al (2004) have broken down the label of lumpen youth into three main 
groups. The “urban marginals,” were those under-educated and -employed youth who were 
hired as thugs by competing parties in the early period of independence, and who later 
found common cause with the student radicals in the 1970s and 80s. Many joined the ex-
panding ranks of the army under the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) junta in 
1992.  Second were the “socially-disconnected village youth,” who were motivated by their 
frustration with local chiefs, their inability to continue their education, and their freedom 
from social obligation. A third group were the illicit miners of the diamond-mining areas 
who were “vulnerable to official harassment, and often working for Mandingo or Lebanese 
traders,” as well as those involved in illegal logging and smuggling, (Keen 2003, 78). Quan-
titative research of the ex-combatants indicates that it was predominantly the later two 
groups, from the rural backgrounds, who filled the ranks of the RUF and Kamajor or Civil 
Defense Forces (CDF), and that most were recruited from the rural Eastern Province border-
ing Liberia, (Richards 2005, 574). These combatants were mainly primary school pupils and 
secondary school dropouts, many of whom had taken up mining, (Peters 2004, 9). 
 Peters (2004) describes three principal reasons that young ex-combatants had for 
voluntarily fighting: overcoming economic constraints and meeting their own material 
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needs, searching for alternative educational opportunities, and reversing the victimhood of 
political exclusion. Though most owed their survival of the war to the classical tactical 
agency described by Honwana (2005), on another level, war had allowed them to carve out, 
literally, a terrain which they dominated. Exhibiting a form of strategic agency, new patrons 
- warlords and commanders - emerged to replace the local big men who had fled with the 
start of the violence. The benefits for rank and file combatants were mainly short term, often 
obtained through ‘pay yourself’ operations. Education, especially higher education, had 
long remained out of reach for those without the sponsorship of patrons. And with war came 
the destruction of schools, and a lack of alternatives for youth. Joining a militia offered the 
potential for learning new skills, whether through the “bush schools” of the RUF, or for 
members of the CDF, by continuing farming and education on the side. However most saw 
this time as wasted, and viewed education as central for preventing re-mobilization. Third, 
weapons, which could be used “to fulfill economic needs [or...] to achieve political 
changes,” were great levelers for youth. This newfound power combined with the appeal of 
a merit-based systems of advance, and with transparent, simple, and stringent rules, includ-
ing a Code of Conduct in the case of the RUF, did much to empower youth who had earlier 
been subject to the injustices of local gerontocracy and nepotism, (Peters 2004, 27).   
 
3.3 The grievances of rural youth 
 Many rural youth have linked their motivations for joining the RUF to the abuses of 
chiefs under this system, and to their need for protection, or for revenge, (Richards 2005, 
578). Arbitrary fines and tribute were mechanisms used to extract labour from young men 
and to keep them tied to the land. Young men found themselves in competition with older, 
wealthy men for access to women, both because of the cost of the bridewealth, and because 
chiefs have monopolized women through the practice of polyginy,4 it was common for 
young men to be fined with marriage infringement, or “woman damage” if they were found 
to be involved in a relationship with a chief’s woman. In contrast, youth with connections to 
the chieftaincy were spared these abuses, and were given privileged treatment with regard to 
land access, (Richards 2005, 578; Fanthrope 2001, 384).  
                                                 
4
 The most common form of polygamy, where a a man has two or more wives at the same time. 
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 Richards (2005) traces the roots of these abuses to the nineteenth century era of the 
domestic slave trade, which provided chiefs with labour for farming. Chiefs exercised social 
control through local courts, and the institution of polyginy. Richards also links the early 
patrimonial loyalties to the practice by warlords of the Mano River forest to use ‘warboys’, 
young men, often with no local connection, for slave raids. These warboys were in turn 
loyal to the patrons who fed, clothed and provided them with women, (Richards 2005, 580). 
Chiefs resisted pressure from the international community to end the domestic slave trade 
(which did not end until 1928), and perpetuated de facto domestic slavery through “unpaid 
community labour levied disproportionately on the younger and poorer members of rural 
society,” (Mokuwa & Richards 2006, 3).  
 Fanthorpe (2001) adds to the understanding of processes of marginalization of rural 
youth who were not part of landed lineages. The creation of a ‘lumpen agency’, he asserts, 
is not strictly due to a crisis of patrimonialism, triggered by the decline of the economy, but 
rather the result of longer term grievances linked to practices for generating local identity, 
which had become exclusionary under the Native Administration (1896). Historic settle-
ment practices of land clearing and enclosure, and the sanction of powerful local leaders, 
initiated strangers and their descendants into communities, and established their entitle-
ments. Under the Native Administration, the colonial state “ossified” boundaries and “cus-
tom” to facilitate tax collection. This was done through the village tax register, which was 
implemented by an expanded chieftaincy system with new levels of sub-chiefs, and by for-
malizing the “‘customary’ rights [of these chiefs] to extract tribute and labour from their 
subjects” which disproportionately affected young socially-disconnected men, (Fanthrope 
2001, 380). Chiefs retained custody of the land (with the exception of mineral resources, 
which were claimed by the colonial government) as well as the power to adjudicate in local 
courts. Selection of Paramount Chiefs, a life-time position, was to be done by Tribal Au-
thorities, which consisted of the headmen of villages counting at least twenty tax payers.  
 The role of chiefs was further distorted from its original inclusive, community-
building function under post-colonial governments. With the joining of the Sierra Leone 
Colony and the Protectorate under the 1951 Constitution, chiefs became a tool for rural el-
ites to reverse the colonial era status quo, which the Freetown Krio elite had dominated. The 
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use of chiefs, who have tended to hold enormous sway with local populations, as political 
brokers to control public opinion, has continued ever since, (Fanthrope 2001, 383).  
 
3.4 Politics and exploitation in the Kono District 
 It was in Kono District where diamonds were first discovered, and began to be com-
mercially mined, during the 1930s.  The bitter sense of injustice that continues to prevail 
among people in the region is rooted in a history of resource exploitation by a locally unac-
countable elite - both foreign and national. The predominant form of diamond mining in Si-
erra Leone is alluvial rather than industrial; it is done on the banks of rivers, streams and in 
swamps on a seasonal basis, using rudimentary tools - shovels, sieves and pails, (Bøås & 
Hatløy 2006, 21). However, access to the best diamond fields has historically been deter-
mined by powerful commercial and political interests, at the cost of youth access to liveli-
hoods. For twenty years during colonial rule, the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST), a 
subsidiary of De Beers, held the exclusive rights to diamond mining and tightly controlled 
diamond fields with paramilitary enforcement, (Bøås & Hatløy 2006, 13). All individual 
mining by non-autochthonous miners was declared illegal, with chiefs accordingly given the 
power to distinguish “strangers”, (Bøås & Hatløy 2006, 14).  Company securities regularly 
clashed with young illegal diamond miners, (Rosen 2005, 74). 
 A migration boom in the 1950s and 60s brought an estimated 35,000 strangers into 
Kono, (Reno 2003, 49) outnumbering the indigenous Kono people, (Rosen 2005, 75). These 
predominantly male youth dreamed of escaping poverty and striking fortune, but with dia-
mond mining restricted to a large foreign firm, these people had to seek the protection of 
chiefs to pursue their mining activities. The punishment for illegal diamond mining (IDM) 
or prospecting was harsh, including: 
...arrest, expulsion, a fine and up to six months in prison, and if they were found 
in possession of a sieve, shovel, a shaker, pickaxe, or any other tool that could be 
used for prospecting or mining they could receive up to twelve months in prison 
with hard labour, (Rosen 2005, 75). 
  
Chiefs derived “informal social control” through this new power, and were able to com-
mand the loyalty of the strangers they protected by choosing not to report their illegal min-
ing activities, (Reno 2003, 50). In other words, the designation of “strangers” had intensi-
fied a dependence of youth upon patrons that was economically motivated. 
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 Alluvial mining was not legalized for individual Sierra Leoneans and their compa-
nies until 1956, with the Alluvial Diamond Mining Ordinance. This concession had been 
prompted by a protest staged by miners in defense of “their rights to engage in small-scale 
mining”, (Bøås & Hatløy 2006, 14). Through the new scheme, the colonial government 
hoped to curtail illegal mining, and to pre-empt miners from appealing to populist inde-
pendence-era party politics to demand a share of the richest diamond deposits, (Reno 2003, 
51) though the scheme of course reserved the richest deposits for the SLST. Chiefs retained 
the power, under the alluvial mining license scheme, to determine strangers and to allocate 
licenses. But only the wealthy and politically well-connected, who could afford licenses, 
normally foreigners, dominated the market, (Bøås & Hatløy 2006, 14).  
 During the period leading to independence, the power chiefs had over mining gangs 
became politicized by the competition between the national parties, which exerted pressure 
to grant licenses to political supporters.  The southern-based SLPP dominated, but the new 
APC, which had a strong northern power base, found support in Kono’s migrant commu-
nity, (Bøås & Hatløy 2006, 14). In the same period, the government launched the first of 
several military operations to drive out the strangers, but with little effect. IDM continued to 
thrive in the absence of what was considered to be fair license allocation, and rather than 
stamping out the illegal diamond trade, the military became involved, accepting bribes to 
turn a blind eye, and setting the pattern which was to continue during the war.   
 In 1968, under the new APC government, Stevens consolidated his power over dia-
mond resources, both for personal enrichment and to enable him to reward political allies. 
The function of the Government Diamond Office was converted from smuggling preven-
tion, to de facto facilitation. By lowering the cost it paid for diamonds, well-placed officials 
were able to reap marginal profits while official diamond mining revenues plummeted, 
(Bøås & Hatløy 2006, 15). The authority to issue mining licenses was also transferred to the 
Ministry of Mines, bypassing the chiefs, and enabling the central government to reward 
loyal APC supporters, and to extend its control over IDM gangs for terrorizing and cowing 
dissidents. Chiefs therefore sided with Stevens and the APC at the cost of their own inde-
pendent control over the IDM gangs, (Reno 2003, 51-52). Lacking rights or secure em-
ployment, the largely immigrant, krio-speaking population of young illegal diamond miners 
in Kono was at the service of patrons, who were, in turn, controlled by the central govern-
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ment. Through the APC Youth wing of the national party, these youth were mobilized into 
thuggery and state-sponsored violence, (Rosen 2005, 78-79).  
 The APC Youth was especially destructive in the upriver diamond fields of the Kono 
District, where the government exercised greater control over chiefs.  The government’s fo-
cus on Kono stemmed from its status as the only district to possess kimberlite (deep shaft) 
mining deposits, accessible only via industrial technologies that require large-scale capital 
investment. Securing the political power base in Kono through chiefs was the key to lucra-
tive government - private sector collusion in the industry, (Reno 2003, 52). Chiefs who sup-
ported the APC, or who relied on APC to remain in power, were able to enrich themselves. 
These arrangements fed the division between local authority and the poor and marginalized 
who were not part of the networks of beneficiaries. Chiefs who did not support the APC 
could be removed from power, with consequences for the client youths they left behind, 
who became exposed to the abuses of Freetown officials and business interests and in some 
cases were driven out of mining sites, (Reno 2003, 53).  
 Youth alienation in Kono continued to foment under these circumstances. In mid 
1990, the successor Momoh regime oversaw as many as 30,000 youth driven off the land in 
IDM clearing operations “Clean Sweep”, then “Clear All.” Both operations were staged un-
der the rubric of structural adjustment policies that sought to choke off smuggling and to 
regulate diamond production and capture revenue, (Reno 2003, 57). The resulting massive 
pool of alienated youth threw its support behind the RUF at the start of the war, (Bøås & 
Hatløy 2006, 16). The unfair treatment of youth by local and national authorities in Kono 
stood in contrast to their counterparts downriver in the Southern Province - SLPP strong-
holds where mining was exclusively alluvial and held less interest for the predatory state. In 
this region, chiefs effectively utilized local initiation rites (Poro) to mobilize anti-APC sup-
port, and retained greater social control over IDM gangs. Youth recruitment in this area fed 
predominantly into the comparatively disciplined and loyal CDF, (Reno 2003, 54). 
 Initially during the war, diamond resources were exploited by parties to the conflict 
on an opportunistic, ad hoc basis. But as the war progressed, the government lost what little 
remained of its control of the diamond trade to the youth that made up the army, private se-
curity forces and insurgency groups, as these parties alternately fought and colluded for con-
trol of these and other resources, (Bøås & Hatløy 2006, 17). By 1998, the cross-border dia-
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mond-for-arms trade with Charles Taylor had become “the modus operandi” of the RUF 
that fueled the conflict, (Bøås & Hatløy 2006, 17). National and international strategies for 
ending the war shifted from “curtailing rebel access” to diamonds through the use of mili-
tary force, to accommodation of RUF leader Foday Sankoh in the 1999 Lomé Peace Ac-
cord, (de Koning 2008, 6). The rebel movement was finally defeated in the summer of 2000, 
both militarily, by British Special Forces, Guinean troops, and a UNAMSIL force armed 
with a more robust mandate, and by the pressure placed on it and its Liberian patron through 
UN sanctions on diamond exports from Sierra Leone, (de Koning 2008, 6).  
 
3.5 The employment challenge 
 For many of the demobilized combatants, war time is was experienced as a period 
where they were able to meet their material needs, and for this reason the period sometimes 
is romanticized in hindsight, (Christensen 2007). While 72,490 passed through the national 
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), the programme was undermined by 
significant shortcomings: its failure to deliver the expected reintegration packages, the diffi-
culty faced by ex-combatants in validating their status and thereby claiming their entitle-
ments, and an “urban bias” in the design of employment schemes which failed to recognize 
the “rural crisis” at the root of the war, (Peters 2006 121-122). A study of the DDR process 
conducted in 2004 found that fighters from all sides were largely “underprivileged individu-
als who had been failed by the Sierra Leonean State,” (Humphreys & Weinstein 2004, cited 
in ICG 2007, 10). The same study estimated that a quarter of those who entered DDR did 
not participate in a training programme, and that of those who completed the programme, 
only 42 percent had found jobs, (ICG 2007, 10). 
 The vast majority of young people in Sierra Leone continue to be caught in the limbo 
between access to education and employment. Although primary school fees have been 
abolished, secondary school fees force many to drop out from the age of 13 to seek em-
ployment, (Women’s Commission 2008). At 34 percent, the country has among the world’s 
lowest literacy rates, (HDR 2007, 32). A startling fact is that although youth make up 59 
percent of the labour force, but only 4% are paid employees, (2004 Population and Housing 
Census cited in HDR 2007, 42). The majority of youth work in the agricultural sector and 
are unpaid, fueling rural-urban economic migration, (Women’s Commission 2008). Most 
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are self-employed in petty trades and services. Lack of private sector investment and an 
oversupply of low-skilled labour drive down the employment opportunities and conditions 
for most youth.   
 
3.6 Reforming local governance 
 Since the end of the war, government has sought to address the conditions that led to 
youth alienation and conflict, including by enhancing public participation in local govern-
ance, reversing the trend towards centralization of power that had been the pattern since in-
dependence, (Jackson 2006). The report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as-
signed responsibility to the impunity of political elites, who “plundered the nation’s assets, 
including its mineral riches, at the expense of the national good. Government accountability 
was non-existent...”, (TRC Report, cited in Fanthrope 2005, 29). But public consultations 
and more recent fieldwork have revealed the complexity of local governance, with contin-
ued popular support for paramount and lower chiefs, alongside the acknowledged need for 
special representation of previously excluded groups, (Jackson 2006, 103; Sawyer: 2008). 
At the same time, there has been well-founded concern that the reinstatement of patrimonial 
rule, through the chieftaincy, could re-marginalize youth and re-create the conditions for 
conflict, (Richards 2005). 
 In 2000 the Chieftaincy system had been restored, though few changes have been 
made. Chiefs continue to be elected for life by local elites, “strangers” continue to lack po-
litical and property rights, women continue to lack equitable inheritance rights, and youth 
continue to be prosecuted for marriage breaches, all of this signifying that the continued 
monopoly by landed classes of for the control of labour, (Richards 2006, 31). The persis-
tence of the grievances of a rural underclass fuels the continuation of a “hyper-mobility” be-
tween mining and agriculture, to the detriment of sectoral innovation and skills-
development, (Richards 2006, 30).  
 So far, the record on public participation has been mixed, with evidence that local 
decision-making has yet to become inclusive of poor and marginalized, (Maconachie 2008, 
12). In the area of community-based natural resource management, Diamond Area Commu-
nity Development Funds (DACDF) were set up in 2001, in order to provide an incentive for 
chieftaincies to engage in legal diamond mining activities, by returning 3% of diamond ex-
  
 51 
port taxes to Chieftaincy Development Committees (CDC), to be spent on small-scale local 
development projects. However, in practice, CDC’s continue to be made up of mostly male 
elites, (Maconachie 2008, 10). This is also reflected in national policies within the sector, 
which have adopted a “legality approach” that prioritizes revenue generation by formalizing 
mining activities, and favours more easily regulated industrial over artisanal mining. This 
approach “risks disenfranchising those with limited means to formalise their position in the 
commodity chain,” (de Koning 2008, 20). Furthermore, it mitigates the scope for addressing 
the underlying structural problems which continue to marginalize youth, such as property 
and land use rights, limited agricultural production and employment generation, (de Koning 
2008, 11).  
 The recent rise in politically-motivated actions by youth against mining companies is 
evidence that marginalized groups, including underemployed, and politically disconnected 
youth, strain to be heard in these decision-making processes and therefore seek out alterna-
tive ways of influencing decisions. Most remarkably, was perhaps the peaceful protest in 
December 2007, staged against the South African Koidu Holdings Mining Company by ag-
grieved property owners who had lived for five years within the blasting envelope, for tardy 
and inadequate compensation, which descended into violence after police forcefully inter-
vened, gunning down two protesters. The report of the independent Jenkins-Johnson en-
quiry included among its recommendations, that future processes of granting prospecting or 
exploration licenses, or mining lease involve the Landowners (e.g. native communities) in 
the negotiations, particularly with respect to delimitation of boundaries, and also specifies a 
fiscal regime to regulate the proportion of profits to return to landowners (e.g. 1/3 of 40%), 
(GoSL White Paper 2008, 7). The Koidu Holdings protest was followed by similar episodes 
of youth and worker unrest directed towards at least five mining companies in Kono Dis-
trict,5 involving incidents ranging from strikes, land occupations, demonstrations and medi-
ated negotiations.  
 The establishment of a democratic architecture of local governance, alongside the 
reinstated 149 chieftaincies, under the Local Government Act (2004), has been intended to 
recalibrate the level of local participation in decision-making. Nineteen Local Councils, 
                                                 
5
 In chronological order: Koidu Holdings Ltd. in Tankoro Chiefdom, AV Charge in Nimiyama Chiefdom, Mile Stone in 
Sandor Chiefdom, Swanfield Mining Company in Niminkoro Chiefdom, and Kariba Kono Ldt, in Gbense Chiefdom. 
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abolished in 1972 by Stevens, were re-established, mandated with promoting development, 
and the ability to raise taxes for this purpose, (HDR 2007, xvi). The delineation of powers 
between chieftaincies and local councils is not thoroughly clear on paper and creates a new 
sources of potential conflict, for instance in the area of finance, and the administrative ca-
pacity both of councils and of chieftaincies remains weak. Decentralization is still in its in-
fancy, and bodies such as Ward Committees are not the fora of vibrant and broad-based 
community debate they are intended to be, (HDR 2007, xix). Sierra Leone’s 2007 Human 
Development Report asserts that among the new LC’s there is “little evidence as yet of a 
more democratic system with people involved in decisions,” (HDR 2007, xviii). At the 
same time, patrimonialism continues to be a strong force behind political engagement, par-
ticularly at the level of the chieftaincy, where chiefs continue to act as political brokers for 
national parties, locking them into relations of mutual dependence with MPs, with no 
downward accountability, (Jackson 2006, 101). For example, in the mining sector, fiscal de-
centralization of “centrally collected taxes among diamond producing chiefdoms” and the 
devolution of licensing to chiefdom levels, which presents an opportunity for community 
involvement, is undermined by the lack of “transparency and responsiveness of chiefly au-
thorities,” and “risks generating local resentment,” (de Koning 2008, 21).  
 
3.7 Social change, and enhanced youth agency? 
 Ethnographic perspectives view war not as a singularly negative phenomenon, but as 
competing social processes of continuity and change, (Richards 2005, 17). Struggles for so-
cial and economic restructuring and preservation do not begin and end with war, but are on-
going. At the same time, war has a transformative impact on culture:  
...war does more than merely disrupt or destroy existing social systems; it 
also creates new systems. Although cruel, ugly, and inhuman, war is by its 
very nature an instrument for social and economic restructuring, (Boas 
2007, 40). 
  
 The violence of war disrupted old social systems. Chiefs and institutions representing 
authority were targeted by the RUF. Social fabric was ripped. Young people, torn from their 
families and forced to commit atrocities as children, feared returning to their communities 
after the war. Girls who had survived the violence of life in the bush, in addition to often 
dealing with sexually transmitted disease, faced the double stigma upon return of being 
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marked as disobedient rebels and damaged goods, (Coulter 2006). A whole generation suf-
fered the consequences of disrupted education, devastated physical infrastructure, social and 
economic capital, and broken social trust after the war ended. The war also gave many 
young people unprecedented power amidst heightened insecurity, and humanitarian proc-
esses brought them into contact with international norms of human rights and social justice 
that have been incorporated into general discourses of power and exploitation. 
 New social systems were forged in the crucible of war. Post-war social changes are 
evident in the “weakening of the patronage system” between the central government and 
provincial towns, the parallel “resurgence of associational life (through which broad groups 
organise on the basis of a common interest - livelihoods, leisure, activity or residence - to 
increase their chances of survival), and renewed demands for government accountability,” 
(ICG 2008, 5). Several ethnographic studies have documented how militia cultures have 
transformed themselves with the end of war, showing an apparent shift towards strategic 
agency.  
 Studies of the motivations of ex-RUF combatants, have described how their sociali-
zation into the culture of the insurgency affected what they would tolerate after the war 
ended, (Richards 1996; Peters 2004). In addition to skills of battle survival, RUF combat-
ants were inculcated into the norms and values of egalitarianism, including rules governing 
the distribution of resources, free access to schooling through “bush schools” and health 
care, codes of conduct and people’s courts, and principle of meritocracy enabling upward 
mobility in command structure. These stood in stark contrast to the nepotism and exclusion 
of elite patrimonial networks, that privileged access to secondary education, scholarships 
and jobs, (Peters 2004). Youth who found that jobs and support promised as part of DDR 
was not forthcoming openly discussed the option of re-mobilisation, where these needs 
would be met, (Peters 2004). Politically, these youth had grown accustomed to the power of 
the gun, and in interviews some expressed their inability to quietly readjust to a society 
where they continued to be politically sidelined. In one unexceptional example, a young 
man suspected of being with the RUF openly challenged the Chief, the later having escaped 
during the war, for excluding the youth who had stayed behind and fought from making de-
cisions about the allocation of humanitarian relief, (Peters 2004, 29). Such examples dem-
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onstrate strategic attempts by youth to redefine what are considered to be acceptable power 
relations. 
 Militia solidarities and moral communities evolved during the course of the war.  
Fithen and Richards (2005) have explored how the strength of rules and cohesiveness of mi-
litia groups explain the trajectory of the war’s violence, and the evolution of social norms. 
According to this perspective, the RUF, originally held together in significant part by its de-
sire for a more equal society, disintegrated into fatalistic anarchy when the egalitarian life 
they had practiced in the camps of the Gola Forest proved incompatible with the need for 
centralised in military operations. Its retreat into illegitimacy among civilians, and the be-
trayal of several peace agreements compounded this crisis of solidarity, (Fithen & Richards 
2005, 126). The CDF, also known as the Kamajors, transformed a traditional and mystical 
practice of solitary hunting into effective fighting units. With the end of the war, CDF hier-
archies returned to an ‘entrepreneurial individualism’, prompted by the need to re-estabish 
themselves in their communities, (Fithen & Richards 2005, 133). 
 To some extent, these militia solidarities and norms were carried forth into peacetime 
enterprises. The return to individualism with the CDF, combined with a wisened civilian 
population to break down the tradition of unquestioning respect for chiefly patrimonial au-
thority. Fithen and Richards see evidence of CDF individualism, and of RUF egalitarianism, 
in the move away from the dependency of patrimonialism towards self-employment and 
horizontal associations (Fithen and Richards 2005, 134). They cite the case of the Bo Town 
Bike Renter’s Association, started by former CDF members to fill a gap in the market for a 
taxi service, which became a huge source of employment for ex-combatants of all sides, 
(Fithen and Richards 2005, 134). As a registered company that is run and staffed almost en-
tirely by ex-combatants, it demonstrates a significant shift towards strategic agency of these 
youth who now use commercial law as a leveling weapon to defend themselves against the 
abuses of authorities, (Richards 2006, 30). 
 A study by Christensen and Utas (2008) of youth and more specifically, remobilized 
ex-combatants in the 2007 General election, highlights examples of how youth tactically 
navigated the shifting political terrain to create strategic possibilities. They reveal how 
youth, who served as resources for politicians, were able to thwart attempts by patrons to 
manipulate them and to turn these situations to their own advantage in a number of ways.  
  
 55 
 The outcome of the 2007 General Election was by no means a foregone conclusion.  
The incumbent SLPP party had been favoured to win the election in 2005, but certainty had 
been thrown into question when the infant PMDC party broke off, taking a proportion of the  
party supporters with it. Tensions mounted with the polarizing run-off election held on Sep-
tember 8th, between APC candidate Koroma and SLPP Berewa, during which PMDC threw 
its support behind the APC party, (IRIN August 2007a). Many youth maximized the oppor-
tunities presented by this uncertain contest, supporting and collecting benefits from multiple 
parties, but in the end jostling to be on the winning side, in what became known as water-
melon politics, (Christensen & Utas 2008).  The term “watermelon politics”, after the hit 
song by pop musician Daddy Saj, captured a new phenomenon of political two-timing: of 
being green on the surface and collecting benefits from SLPP, while being red underneath, 
and voting APC. This trend was seen to be a break with social norms reciprocity, as ex-
pressed in the symbolic exchange of the cola nut - “a gift which entails a moral obligation,” 
(Utas 2007, 62). Economic rather than moral imperatives underlie watermelon politics and 
“mercenary democracy” more generally. But far from amoral, “doing watermelon” was seen 
to be a legitimate response to the vote-buying of corrupt politicians, and its absorption as a 
term into mainstream terminology signified a popular defense of this new practice, (Utas 
2007; Christensen & Utas 2008, 530). 
 Utas (2007) has proposed that the collective impact of many youth taking the money 
from one party while voting for another may yield positive unintended consequences for 
democratic consolidation, by stealing the potency out of vote-buying and forcing parties to 
appeal to ideals rather than pocketbooks, (Utas 2007, 65). There is, indeed, reason to read 
optimism into this behaviour. Loyalty to patrons as a social value and an organizing princi-
ple in politics can prevent people from uniting on the basis of shared interests and ideals that 
cut across societal cleavages. The mercenary motivations of youth show that such values are 
not unassailable, and may in fact be declining in importance. They empower youth by ena-
bling them to make a freer choice about whom to support in elections.  
 However, it is important not to overstate the agency of watermelon politics and other 
shape shifting behaviours of youth in the public sphere. In Honwana’s terms, watermelon 
politics is the result of tactical agency which manipulates existing options within a system 
of power relations to the advantage of the agent, rather than directly shaping that system and 
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the choices available to them in a strategic manner. As a result, youth experiences of en-
hanced agency are, in large part, determined by political circumstances and configurations 
of power, such as the uncertain victory of either APC or SLPP in the second run-off. And as 
a consequence, their power ebbs with the changing of these circumstances once elections 
are over. The counter, and less hopeful, and even depressing, interpretation of this predomi-
nant form of agency is that while youth may enhance their own prospects through these ac-
tions, in doing so, they help to recreate the very system that limits their options. By playing 
into the politics of the dominant parties, youth bypass the opportunity to create political al-
ternatives that are more responsive to their needs.  
 Tactical agency during the 2007 presidential and parliamentary elections was also 
prominent among ex-combatants, who were remobilized from militia factions into partisan 
security squads tasked with protecting candidates and party offices, as well as creating “a 
general state of panic,” (Christensen & Utas 2008, 522). With few exceptions, they were not 
driven by ideological convictions or personal loyalties. Rather, supporting a political party 
was viewed instrumentally, for the many opportunities the elections presented. Many youth 
viewed the elections as their “last chance” to benefit after neither the war nor demobiliza-
tion had improved their social standing. Their motivations ranged from the personal protec-
tion from police and government officials afforded by their political connections; the social 
aspects of living with former militia units, considered family; the immediate needs of 
money, food and shelter; to longer term prospects, including promises of jobs and educa-
tion, (Christensen & Utas 2008, 423-429). They viewed politicians with deep mistrust, for 
having punished them after the war with imprisonment, and they were keenly aware of the 
strictly transactional nature of this relationship of necessity. But while entering into a rela-
tion with politicians may have expanded their social possibilities, their mode of engagement 
in the elections was pre-defined, drawing only on their violent resources to serve as imple-
menters of political dispensations. 
 Attempts to break the mold of tactical agency were evident among one group of 
youth during this election. In a more sinister variation of ‘doing watermelon’, ex-
combatants, unwilling to tie their fortunes to any one party, carved out a third option for 
themselves by leveraging their power to intimidate politicians and extort payments on the 
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night time ‘politician patrol,’ (Christensen & Utas, 2008, 531). However, the strategic na-
ture of this agency was, to a large extent, also conditional upon the electoral context.  
 In contrast to the evidence of changing social norms and increasing independence, 
Bøås (2007) highlights the continuities in pre and post-war deference to patrons. He illus-
trates the paradox of youth such as Maskita Bockarie who, in becoming warlords, replicated 
the behaviours and inequalities of the system against which they had spent their entire lives 
struggling. He illustrates a typical path for marginalized youth who, frustrated by the ardu-
ous and humiliating experience of life as victims of poverty, corruption, and limited social 
options, were drawn into war in a last-ditch attempt to have a future. Some discovered af-
firmation in their rise to power within society. But power in these circumstances was a zero-
sum resource, to be enjoyed by the warlord, at the expense of those he had to stand upon to 
achieve those heights. “What started as a social revolt ended up as a perverted version of the 
state the movement initially rebelled against,” (Bøås 2007, 51). If practices such as water-
melon politics and ‘tricks’ lead us to question the apparent marginality of youth and to re-
evaluate the limits of their agency, then stories of youth such as Bockarie who may pay a 
high moral price to ascend beyond the ranks of their former patrons lead us to question their 
apparent power, and the actual extent of their agency in relation to structural constraints and 
imperatives.  
 The use of commercial law, and the extortion of politicians represent evidence that 
youth, for better or worse, are challenging the unquestioning authority of elders and titles, 
and are actively shaping, and leveling their world. Custom, for many, is no longer a good 
enough reason to live by certain social rules, if these rules discriminate against them. How-
ever, as I demonstrate in the next chapter, these are islands of strategic agency in a patrimo-
nial context where marginalized youth cannot always afford the cost of independence. The 
small, subversive victories of watermelon politics may well bring about welcome change by 
making politicians realize that votes are earned, not bought. But these tactical strikes against 
the establishment are indirect, displaying a reluctance to bite the hand that feeds. Hope for 
democratic consolidation must first confront and address the fact that youth are part of the 
system that oppresses them.   
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3.8 The significance of the 2008 Local Elections in Kono District 
 The 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary elections were the first post-conflict elec-
tions to be organized by the country’s National Electoral Commission since the UN-
supervised elections in 2002. They oversaw an historic peaceful transfer of power from 
SLPP to APC, marred only by isolated incidents of violence, (ACE 2007). Ernest Bai 
Koroma of the APC party won the presidency in a tight run-off contest against SLPP candi-
date Solomon Berewa, returning power to the party that had last ruled the country for three 
decades as an authoritarian regime into the final gasps of failed statehood. In the final count, 
the APC party won 59 seats out of 112 seats in Parliament, with SLPP receiving 45 and 
PMDC 10, (SL Encyclopedia 2008).   
 The SLPP party, credited with ending the war, had come to power in a landslide elec-
tion in 2002; but in power it had been a disappointment, blamed by many for the economic 
mismanagement and high level corruption that held back the country’s recovery, (BBC 
2007). The incumbent party was defeated by a protest vote, delivered both by groups who 
had been excluded from ethno-regional redistribution, but also from within the party’s 
southern Mende supporters, (Mateo 2007). These were mainly younger people, who, frus-
trated with the gerontocratic party establishment, followed veteran leader Charles Margai 
into the splintered PMDC party, and then went on to support the APC in the run-off, (ICG 
2008, 3). Demographics,6 combined with the general acceptance of youth exclusion as a 
cause of past and potential future conflict, dictated that all parties fiercely courted the 
“youth vote.” Youth were placed at the centre of party political strategies, in terms of the 
issues, their participation in rallies and voter mobilization, and leading street-level confron-
tations between parties, (Mateo 2007). But the voting behaviour of individual youths con-
tinued to be determined primarily by ethno-regional factors and the need for change, rather 
than by any explicit and self-aware “youth consciousness”, (Mateo 2007).  
 Ethno-regional considerations guided Ernest Bai Koroma’s choice of running mate, 
Sahr Samuel Sam-Sumana. The choice of the native Kono investor for Vice President was 
linked to the District’s status as a swing state (Concord Times 2008) which, since independ-
ence, had tended to follow the political pendulum at the centre. Kono was coloured green in 
                                                 
6
 Forty percent of the 2.6 million people registered to vote in the 2007 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections were 
under the age of 27, (IRIN 2007). 
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the 2002 landslide election for the SLPP, when the party won 86.6 % of the votes, compared 
to only 8.6% for APC, (SL Web [website]). But the outcome of the 2007 run off was far less 
predictable, with SLPP failing to win “the anticipated support”, (Christensen & Utas 2008, 
532). In Koidu, tension ahead of the run-off erupted into violence as SLPP and APC party 
supporters clashed in the street and a curfew was imposed, (APA 2007). 
 In Kono however, the final outcome was an anomaly, with the opposition SLPP 
holding seven out of eight seats, and an eagerly awaited Vice President7 who lacked a man-
date by his home constituency. Under these highly reactive conditions, the local elections 
which followed less than a year later, took on greater significance. They presented a chance 
to correct the imbalance, colouring over the green with red, and to prove the popularity of 
the still new APC government. Vice President Sam-Sumana, son of Kono soil, and new pa-
tron of the youth in the district was the ticket to delivering the needed sea change.  
 The combination of these factors made the stakes for local elections higher in Kono 
than in other areas. Adding to the volatility was the large contingent of underemployed 
youth, dominated by ex-combatants, and the timing of the election, which followed on the 
heels of a spate of confrontations with mining companies, including that with Koidu Hold-
ings Ltd which had ended with two dead, (IRIN 28 December 2007). Fears of violence ran 
high in the newspapers and among opposition supporters that Kono was “hot” and that vio-
lence could easily spark. The APC expended significant resources in colouring the Kono 
map red, and once again the APC Youth League swept across the district, mobilizing young 
voters to vote for their brother Sam-Sumana. Although the local elections were found to be 
peaceful and credible, (SL Encyclopedia 2008b) the campaign period was marred by iso-
lated incidents of political violence and intimidation. In the one major incident of the cam-
paign, APC youth reportedly crashed the SLPP rally day scheduled for June 13th, pelting 
stones and jeering, cutting the rally short and forcing the police hastily escort to visiting op-
position leader Solomon Berewa away from the scene, (Tankoro Police [Interview 64]).  
Acts of intimidation were believed by many to be intended to discourage opposition and in-
dependent candidates from running. An official working with the National Electoral Com-
                                                 
7
 While providing the resources to pull the country out of poverty, Kono had always lacked its own high level represen-
tation, and remained a backwater in terms of development. To date, the district lacks running water and electricity is 
provided only by generators. The appointment of a Kono man as VP was unprecedented, and widely perceived to herald 
an opportunity for development to finally arrive.  
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mission observed that of the 18 out of 70 candidates who had withdrawn their nominations, 
a disproportionate number, was from Kono, and that of these, none represented the APC 
party, (NEC, Freetown, 2008 [Interview 12]). Walking through the streets of Koidu town, 
Kono’s main city, it was clear which party was dominant - almost all opposition party post-
ers, with the exception of ones on the inside of a few brave shops, had been torn down. The 
final results brought a clear victory for the APC, which won 253 out of 456 councilor seats. 
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4. Findings and analysis 
 
4.1 The ‘attack’ on No.11 
 “No.11 was not a protest - just survival,” I was corrected. “Just move for the youth 
because suffering plenty! Just make benefit for the youth” (Central Youth/No.11 [Interview 
77]). 
 On April 23rd 2008, large numbers of youth invaded the site of a diamondipherous 
sand hill owned by Kariba Kono Ltd. and started washing the gravel for diamonds. The 
No.11 oversize dump, located near the town of Sefadu in the chiefdom of Gbense, is a small 
mountain of previously mined alluvial sand tailings from various of the surrounding chief-
doms. Over the years, several companies have held rights for retreatment, starting with the 
Sierra Leone Selection Trust in the 1960s, and currently by Kariba Kono Ltd. Measured at 
4.7 million cubic meters of sand,(Mineral Commodities 2006) it would take a good five 
minutes to walk its periphery.  
 The attack on the No.11 sansan was not spontaneous. During the 2007 election cam-
paign, a promise had been made by the APC party, and specifically by Vice President Sam 
Sumana, that if they won the elections, the party would distribute the sand to the Kono 
youth. Some had heard this promise announced at the large Community Field gathering 
place at a political rally for the APC during the 2007 campaign, (Central Youth/No.11 [In-
terview 60]); others had heard it broadcast over the radio (Gunpoint Youth/No.11 [Interview 
97]); and many only knew of it through word of mouth. But all were aware of this promise. 
Then in September 2007 APC was elected and the new government sworn in, and by April 
2008 they had still not made good on their promise to the youth who had been a pivotal 
constituency in their election. When asked what had sparked them into action, most youth I 
spoke to pointed to the same provocative statement over local radio by an opposition MP 
T.E. Kaingbanja, who was gave a thirty minute interview slating the APC party for reneging 
on its promise to the youth to distribute the sand (No.11 Leader [Interview 102]). The youth 
attacked the sand the very next day.  
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 News of that the youth had taken the sand spread rapidly, and new youth came from 
near and afar to seize the opportunity for enrichment. For five days they came in increasing 
numbers, from all parts of the country, estimated to be over a thousand in number, (No.11 
Site Supervisor [Interview 58]).8 They brought shovels, buckets, rice bags and shakers to 
carry the sand, (Gunpoint Youths/No.11 [Interview 103]).   
 With youth swarming the sand, chiefdom and government officials met with com-
pany representatives and attempted to hastily broker a compromise with Kariba to divide the 
sand, but found that the rights to processing of the dump belonged exclusively and legally, 
with the company. The APC party had been embarrassingly caught out in a promise that 
wasn’t its to make, though it is not clear at which point this became general knowledge. The 
youth were clearly trying to force the hand of the ruling party. In a politically loaded act, 
several individuals ran a red flag up to the top of the sand hill, planting it in the centre, next 
to the solitary tree growing at the top of the heap. Taking their plight to the airwaves, the 
Chairman of the District APC Youth League broke ranks with his party, reprimanding it for 
failing to keep its promise on BBC radio, (APC Youth League Chairman [Interview 16]). 
Meanwhile the youth, encouraged by rumours that a deal had been reached with the com-
pany, and others out of defiance, kept going to the sansan. By day 3, the company site su-
pervisor estimated that they were more than a thousand – young men and women – and be-
gan transporting the sand out of the site for treatment elsewhere. The company called the 
police, who were unable to control the crowd. Youth set up roadblocks, (No.11 Site Super-
visor [Interview 58]). By day five, the police came with reinforcements from the army and 
police from other districts, (No.11 Site Supervisor [Interview 58]). Chaos broke out as po-
lice rounded up 67 of them into vehicles using tear gas, and took them to the Tankoro police 
station, (Tankoro Police [Interview 64]). They were pursued by angry riotous mobs back 
into Koidu city, heading directly to the Tankoro police station which they attempted to set 
on fire. One newspaper estimated that over 300 angry youths clashed with police and mili-
tary personnel, (Kamara 24 April 2008). Several youths were said to have wrested arms 
from police officers, including a handgun and an AK47, (Kamara 24 April 2008). Unrest 
and panic broke out across the town and businesses closed, (Magistrate [Interview 83]) and 
                                                 
8
 It seems as though the initial number was between 300 and 500 youths, and that this number expanded greatly, though 
I was not able to find accurate numbers, some estimated over a thousand, to “thousands”. 
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shots were allegedly fired into the air, (SLPP Candidate/Community Friendship Org [Inter-
view 53]). A police outpost was allegedly burned to the ground (SLPP Candi-
date/Community Friendship Org [Interview 53]), houses were vandalized, including the 
compound of a chief. Live ammunition was fired and generators were stolen, (Gbense Chief 
[Interview 57]). It took three days for the police and military to quell the riot; “the town was 
a no-go area,” (Magistrate [Interview 83]). A curfew was imposed.  
 Five9 were charged and had to appear before the court of the Magistrate, including 
the APC District Youth League Chairman, and the leader and some members of the Central 
Youths. All were released on bail (Magistrate [Interview 83]), allegedly by a APC candidate 
running for District Chairman, (Local journalist [Interview 54]). In an unusual move by the 
youth, a delegation of around fifteen made a trip to Freetown to register a formal apology 
with the Vice President and the First Lady, also a Kono native, (Central Youths & Balance 
Youth Chair/No.11 [Interview 99]). The Youth League Chairman, who had been suspended 
from his position following the attack and interview, was allegedly returned to the position 
by the Vice President while visiting Kono in the month of June, just a month ahead of the 
local elections, (Central Youth/No.11 [Interview 60]).  
 
4.2 The youth, and their grievances 
 I was not able to clarify the exact date or wording of promise to distribute the No.11 
tailings, but this aside, the promise it was common knowledge. It had been announced, 
some say by Koroma, though most mention Sam Sumana, in Koidu’s open air Community 
Centre on a campaign visit to the District ahead of the 2007 elections. It had been part of a 
larger promise to end the historical neglect of development in Kono District, which had con-
tinued, despite promises to the contrary, under the post-war SLPP government of Tejan 
Kabbah, (APC Party [webpage]). The high hopes of APC’s ability to deliver were linked in 
no small part to the position of their native “son of the soil,” Sumana, as Vice President. 
Many youth made an explicit connection between the election of the VP in the subsequent 
local elections, and the eventual release of the sand: 
The original promise during the campaign was that if the youths of Kono vote 
for the APC party and put them in power and Sam Sumana to become the Vice 
                                                 
9
 There is a discrepancy here, where a newspaper article (Kamara 2008) put this number to 30 people charged, while the 
Magistrate (from the Court for Kono District) quoted five. I was not able to verify. 
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President, he will use his power to release the sand for the youths, create job 
facilities etc. (No.11 Leader [Interview 102]). 
 
When asked what had been the proximate causes of the attack on the sansan, participants 
almost without exception brought up the same trigger - the provocative interview broadcast 
over the local radio by Honourable Tamba E. Kaingbanja.    
We were promised to be given the sand if we vote for Sam Sumana to become 
Vice President. While they did not fulfill their promise, they made a member 
of the opposition party Honourable T.E. Kaingbanja went to the air and pro-
voked us, use insult languages. [Quoting the MP:] ‘No job to take care of our 
families and after the elections they abandoned us.’ So as such we decide to 
create job for ourselves or find means for our livelihood.[...] We never had a 
plan to attack the sand but it was only because of  the provocative language we 
heard from the radio by T.E. Kaingbanja, one of the SLPP Honourables, 
(No.11 Leader [Interview 102]). 
 
That honourable come here over the radio and use provocative statement about 
the youth and the sand. He day that the VP had promised us the sand. Now he 
have won the election [the VP], …he don’t give us the sand. They [SLPP] are 
the people who sold the sand to Kariba. This make us a wealth of angry. That 
make us to mobilize the youth….(Gunpoint Youth/No.11 [Interview 97]).   
 
1: The former honourable that won in this constitution [constituency], that de-
feated the VP...T.E. Kaingbanja. So because of that, [he] said this: APC gov-
ernment had lied to us. He came with his campaign and said...VP is ly-
ing...[breaking his] promise to give us the sansan. 
2: which cannot happen...a lot of propaganda against the VP,  
(Central Youths & Balance Youth Chair/No.11 [Interview 99]).  
 
Somewhat surprisingly, they did not express anger with the APC for its inaction (the youth 
were not aware that the promise was invalid at the time of the attack). Partly this may be be-
cause of the party was still in the honeymoon period of its first year in office, but partly it 
also because of the timing of the research which was during and around the time of the local 
election, as is explained further below. 
 In any event, the statements by the youth made plain that their motivations were pro-
foundly linked to grievances against the SLPP party. Among the youth I spoke with, SLPP 
was perceived as having betrayed its promise of local development in favour of self-interest 
and greed, in collusion with the chiefdom and the foreign mining companies. The statement 
therefore stirred up deep-seated resentment towards the party among participating youth. 
Many said it had been ironic that the party which had initially sold the land, against the in-
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terests of the local people, was now cynically gaining political mileage from the APC’s 
“fake promise” to the youth. It was as much the hypocrisy of the context, the youth claimed 
had galvanized them into action, as it was the prospect that they might not get the sand, or 
the unthinkable - that APC might turn out to be another disappointment - a risk they could 
not afford to take. The SLPP government has been blamed by many for sidelining the com-
munity, to allow unsafe and exploitative mining practices. Certain chiefs have been re-
garded by some youth as beneficiaries of this exploitative system who sold out their com-
munities: 
They [the chiefs] were with SLPP, the government of the day. They politi-
cized the whole sand system, (APC Candidate [Interview 46]).  
 
Youth grievances revealed themselves partly in narratives of the hegemony of foreign run 
corporations, whose profiteering interests were at odds with the needs of the community. 
Many youth felt the company was operating under “selfish interests”. The No.11 attack had 
been part of a flurry of defiant acts against mining companies no behalf of youth and work-
ers (often including youth) to take place in the period from December 2007 up until the 
Kariba attack in April 2008.  Incidents of confrontation, in the form of strikes, land occupa-
tions, demonstrations and mediated negotiations, took place against at least five mining 
companies,10 including Kariba Kono (SL) Ltd. The list of grievances ranged from poor 
working conditions among employed youths, to the failure of companies to provide ade-
quate employment or neglect of land with community interests. They also complained about 
the failure to honour commitments to contribute towards local development and pointed to 
the more damaging consequences of mining operations, such as environmental degradation, 
to harmful effects of blasting on property owners, and flawed resettlement schemes.  
 But, in the context of local elections perhaps, corporate actors, while vilified, were 
not always accorded the same level of blame as were the national politicians and local au-
thorities who had profited from these sales. For many, their grievances were rooted in the 
sale of one of few remaining diamond-rich sites to a company that now prohibited their ac-
cess. Several youth had explained how they themselves had once mined the No.11 tailings. 
At first they had done so openly, during the NPRC military regime, and then illegally under 
                                                 
10
 In chronological order: Koidu Holdings Lts. in Tankoro Chiefdom, AV Charge in Nimiyama Chiefdom, Mile Stone 
in Sandor Chiefdom, Swanfield Mining Company in Niminkoro Chiefdom, Kariba Kono Ltd. In Gbense. 
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SLPP, bribing security guards on the night shift. But this system had come to a stop after the 
sand had been sold to Kariba, and security was tightened. The post-war government had, in 
their view, impoverished their situation even more than it had been during the war:  
1: NPRC allow free mining for the citizens of Sierra Leone. But for SLPP, 
now they sell the land to different investors where the citizens don’t have any 
rights...one reason why hardship..  
2: Therefore those are the people that are embezzling our minerals.  
Who?  
2: The investors they are giving all the contracts to. [...]  
3: Life in days of NPRC was better compared to past SLPP government be-
cause in days of NPRC there was freedom of peaceful assembly and associa-
tion and also encouraged the youth man that is not working. Can go any-
where...[mining]. Open place...if you get diamond, can sell it for yourself. 1: 
[...] Now they sell all the land to investors. Can’t go work, they will arrest you. 
The white people. 
3: Even a black man [will arrest you]…[SLPP] take productive site and give to 
investors…Example Kariba sansan…was a waste for people to get 
free…SLPP sell sansan to a company only to deprive the youth of this country 
…because that sansan belong to the youth. It’s the ordinary sand 
which…white people…waste. These diamonds not important to them. 
Like…education or medical.  
2: [SLPP] Fail us in all aspects.  
1: Where we go to make our living they take and sell. NPRC never did that. 
2:…If you see us now begging, SLPP did that to us. 
(Central Youths & Balance Youth Chair/No.11 [Interview 99]).   
  
The taking of the sand was therefore as much a political statement as it was an act of sur-
vival. Frustrated by their chronic marginalization, and yet another broken promise, youth 
took the law into their own hands to force a concession in the name of social justice.  
 The collective action was also entirely youth-led. As a former leader of the Central 
Youths recounted: 
..After they won we asked them about the sand. They told us to wait, wait, 
wait, all this time wait. Instead, they started discouraging us from mining. 
Let’s put all our attention [on agriculture]….After that meeting, most of they 
boys become angry that the promise they make has not been fulfilled. So we 
called an emergency meeting among ourselves. 
Who? 
The youth leader, [name]. He alert all the youth that we should go and work 
there by force. To mine the sand, so we can get something. The police went 
there but for 2 consecutive days they were unable to remove us from the sand, 
(Central Youth/No.11 [Interview 60]).  
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While many could not identify who started the movement, a number pointed to the Leader 
of the APC Youth League for Kono District as the organizer who had led the youth in an act 
of defiance against the party, and who had given the BBC interview, (SLPP Candidate/CFO 
[Interview 53]).     
 The youth also used symbolism to make their case politically compelling. The sig-
nificance of the attack was planted at the top of the sand hill, in the form of a red flag. I 
asked several youths about its meaning:   
To show that this sand belong to the youth. The youth are children of this 
country, they are supposed to benefit from the land, 
(Gunpoint Youth/No.11 [Interview 97]).  
 
Another responded that the red flag represented the unfulfilled promise of the APC, and that 
erecting it was a pressure tactic to compel the APC party to act:  
Red symbolize APC, because they have promise us before, so we think of 
one strategy we can use [to force them to fulfill their promise], 
    (Central Youths & Balance Youth Chair/No.11 [Interview 99]). 
   
Kariba site workers who were present during the attack plainly read political messages into 
the event: “These are the disgruntled youth, political. Politics means separation,”(Kariba 
workers [Interview 58]). But what could have appeared to be a proxy battle by national par-
ties had implications that ran deeper into the local politics of equitable distribution. Many of 
the site workers held close connections to the chiefs, and had been among those to support 
SLPP in the 2007 elections. Three of the four we spoke with had now switched over to sup-
porting APC for the local elections, but still revealed concerns that the youth had been mo-
tivated by political score-settling from the previous SLPP era: 
Worker 1: As soon as they know you are SLPP you are in trouble.  
Worker 4: When they come here... 
Worker 1: They came with a red flag. They went and put o top of the sand. 
Saying the sand is belonging to APC youth.  
Worker 4: They term us as SLPP because during time of SLPP all the chiefs 
were SLPP. So as soon as saw us, said these people were recommended 
[by] the chiefs. So all SLPP. Some here not recommended by chiefs but by 
chiefdom authorities. Because this recommendation was open to all authori-
ties. 
Could you explain? 
Worker 4: The Paramount Chief and Chiefdom speaker ask every section 
chief to recommend few people. This was done, 




What the fourth worker was indicating about favouritism in the hiring practices of the com-
pany appeared to be the case. Of about thirty workers on the site, Sia was able to identify 
family connections to chiefs in several cases, in addition to several of the above and other 
workers who readily admitted to receiving recommendations for their jobs. Unsurprisingly, 
part of the local dimension of this grievance was therefore the exclusion of youth from these 
sought-after employment prospects with the companies, which they viewed as being re-
served for the well-connected. One youth who did not participate in the No.11 attack, but 
who ran for Local Councilor explained that he had at one point worked for the company be-
fore it had fully started up operations, as part of a small crew of 10 other youth, but had not 
been paid for nine of the months he had worked there. He had taken his case to the elders 
and quit his job after receiving no help, but observed that later, after the company had 
started up operations again, these chiefs had brought in “their own brothers” to work there, 
(SLPP Candidate/CFO [Interview 53]). Similarly, another who had participated in No.11, 
and who had worked for a short time with the company, explained that, while he had re-
ceived pay for the first month of work, certain chiefs had intervened and pressured him and 
others to leave: 
The chiefs said not to work there...they want their brothers to work there. 
When the chiefs heard we got one month pay, the chiefs intervened imme-
diately - that the money was too much. So telling ‘the house of the chiefs 
are not yet filled, so cannot expect the house of others to be filled.’ That 
was Chief [name], (Central Youth/No.11 [Interview 60]). 
 
The local and national political grievances relating to exclusion from patronage networks 
and decision-making processes about local resources were strong motivating factors. How-
ever, these appeared to be secondary to the immediate opportunity presented for survival: 
Was No.11 done by APC youths? 
No.11 was mixed. Everyone wanted to work. That’s why not political, 
(Central Youth/No.11 [Interview 60]). 
 
The principal commonality among the Kono youth who joined the attack was their unem-
ployed status, including occasional miners. The membership of most of the central Koidu 
political youth groups was also in attendance, though they participated in their personal ca-
pacity rather than as groups. Discourses of basic survival were strongly attached to reasons 
for participating in the attack, as explained by this 18 year old miner:  
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Why did you go to No.11? 
Just somewhere to attach ourselves for survival. Because stealing – if youth 
man steal in this town they beat him mercilessly, (Central Youths/No.11 
[Interview 78]).  
  
Many of the youth I had spoken to were miners without sponsors. This meant their mining 
work, particularly during the rainy season, was extremely irregular, as they relied on filling 
in vacant spots where minors didn’t show up for work. In contrast, most of the youth I 
spoke with who were not involved in the No.11 attack gave as their reason that they were 
busy doing a job, including sponsored miners. In addition, several also stated that they did 
not believe in, or feared the repercussions of taking the law into their own hands, (SLPP 
Candidate/CFO [Interview 53]; Konos Park Youth Chair [Interview 61]). 
   I had only begun to scratch the surface of the social ramifications of their situation. 
The humiliating effect of this poverty was made strikingly clear during one interview I held 
with three young men about the No.11, when one of them commented on my purchasing of 
some drinks, to fuel us through the long interview: 
2: In NPRC days. It was free! [diamonds]  
1: By this time, when you come here, we offer you drink, we give you small 
diamond. Very pity, very shameful for us to come and you buy drinks for 
us. [emphasis added], (Central Youths & Balance Youth Chair/No.11 [In-
terview 99]). 
 
The “social moratorium” in which these youth were suspended was also evident from the 
unsympathetic regard in which they were held by some members of the community. Dis-
courses of youth idleness frequently followed talk of the political youth, fueled by the as-
sumption that ex-combatants, having been able during the war to take what they wanted for 
free, were not socialized into working for their pay. One of the chiefs in the area (himself 
not held in high regard by the youth) had this to say of the youth behind No.11, whom he 
did not distinguish from those involved in the elections business:  
[They] don’t go to school, don’t learn a trade, want to live fine. A lot of 
jobs [are available, being paid] 6-7000 leones a day to reclaim 
[mines]…they don’t do it. 
Why? 
Feel to live idly and live fine. That’s why they are so troublesome at elec-
tions. Because want money. They come to me, ‘Chief I will help you…’ 




4.3 Deliberate law-breaking  
 Those who joined in the attack of the No.11 had different levels of awareness about 
what they were doing. Some had heard first hand the promise by the APC party to release 
the sand to the youth, and had been among those directly provoked by T.E. Kainbanja’s in-
terview. Others had heard only rumours of a promise. Others joined in the bonanza with no 
advance warning or knowledge of any plan, but simply to try to ‘make hay while the sun 
was shining’. Over a thousand youth were estimated to have descended on the sand, coming 
from other chiefdoms and even crossing the border from Guinea. It is unlikely that all of 
them realized that by doing so, they were taking the law into their own hands. But among 
those living in Koidu city with whom I spoke with, this much was clear, both from their 
words and actions, (No.11 Group Leader [Interview 102]).  
 People sometimes referred to ‘the attack’ or ‘the strike’ on the sand, or alternatively 
‘when the youth “took” or “stormed” the sand.’ Though combined with the violence that 
later broke out in Koidu town, the images evoked are somewhat chaotic. But there was 
clearly a level or organization involved. While many youth joined the activity in what they 
believed to be a spontaneous and opportunistic mobilisation of youth; others spoke of a 
planned act. One youth mentioned even a rudimentary plan that assigned a division of la-
bour among the youths for once the sand was captured:  
Were you at No.11? 
Ya, because everybody was there. [I was there] to guide as a security. 
What do you mean? 
Because the place was not open, so we were ready to set up a team if the 
place is free - who will be security, who will be miners...(Balance 
Youth/No.11 [Interview 74]). 
 
On the whole it appeared that the decision to take the sand was a calculated one, at least by 
the youth leaders, who had weighed up the options of breaking the law against their likeli-
hood of freeing the sand.   
 The attack was no frenzy of gratuitous violence, but began as a relatively controlled 
exercise that began to degenerate with the confrontation with police.  But these acts of vio-
lence which followed, the attempt to burn the police station, the overpowering of a police 
officer for a gun, the vandalism and violence against residents and shop-owners, were de-
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scribed by some as the work of opportunistic and undisciplined individuals, rather than re-
flecting the behaviour of the majority.   
…Pai Eye - he was once a soldier in the war and dismissed after the war 
because of behaviour. He has nothing to do anymore, so decided to go and 
wait for opportunities like this, (Community Friendship Organisation 
Chairman [Interview 41]).   
 
So people closed their business, they started attacking people - ordinary 
citizens. Just to create trouble, (SLPP Candidate/CFO [Interview 53]).   
 
Following the bloody confrontation between protestors and police at Koidu Holdings, less 
than five months prior, it was perhaps not surprising that some youth reacted with violence. 
But, as the ex-combatant who had taken the gun from the police officer explained, far from 
being random or purely reactionary, for some youth violence itself became an act of justice, 
to redress the broken promise made to the youth:  
I’m a commanding chief, we need our troops. To lead our troops. When I 
lead the troops we have a promise I hold. During past campaign in the 
Presidential election, they told the youth when we vote for them they are 
going to distribute the sand to the youth. When we went, we saw so many 
police with rifle and shot [rubber bullets] against us. Some of us were ex-
combatants, so we take revenge on them. I’m in the jungle at that time, I 
told them [the youth] let us stand. Every human life leave there a sacrifice 
of Kono youths, (Central Youth/No.11 [Interview 47]).   
 
The same conversation revealed discourses of retribution and revenge, targeting those in po-
sitions of power and authority:  
What was the plan? 
Our honourable councilors, elders, our chairman, all of them – capture and 
take to police station. They open fire against us; we open fire against them, 
(Central Youth/No.11 [Interview 47]). 
  
Others continued to be convinced of the rightness of their actions, even after it became 
known that the company legally held the user rights to the sand: 
Sia: Did you know that most of you break the law? 
No, we didn’t break the law. 
Sia: Why? 
Because it belongs to we the youths. It is the waste property of another 
company. ...the sand is the waste product of SLS/NDMC. The chiefs have 
closed all the mining around ...We have nowhere to mine and get money 
and since we are not educated to work in offices, we only depend on the 
sand as a way of creating job for our livelihood. 
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Sia: Do you know that the sand belongs to the company? 
No, it does not belong to the company. The sand was given to us [the chief-
dom] by other company (SLST/NDMC) that were rich enough to do mining 
for themselves. It is because Kariba has no money that is why they are 
fighting to get the waste of other companies, or they do not want to respect 
the social corporate responsibilities with regards to mining (Gunpoint 
Youths/No.11 [Interview 103]).  
 
To some extent, their strategy had started paying off, as one of the Gbense Chiefs, an “un-
cle” of the VP, met with the company at the police station to negotiate a compromise, re-
questing 30 percent of the gravel for the youth, (Kariba Operations Director [Interview 95]). 
No agreement was reached. But already, rumours had already spread that a deal had been  
struck with the company to divide the sand, and that individuals could access portions of it 
for washing through a ticket system: 
The company were afraid of their properties if the youth working there. 
[They] call the Paramount Chief. Youth were alleging the Paramount Chief 
sold the sand to Kariba, so that’s why don’t want to come to their aid. They 
should talk to the company and give half the sand [to the youth]. So they 
did that talk to the company and give half to the youth. So no sooner they 
did that the youth were jubilating all over, because rumour that No.11 sand 
released, and divided and give half to the youth, (Gunpoint Youth/No.11 
[Interview 98].    
 
Hardly erratic or uncontrolled, but rather, reflecting the faith that a deal favourable to the 
youth was being negotiated, the same informant explained the efforts made by the youth to 
respect company property and equipment: 
So they did that. They shared the sand. Said this part is for the youth. Be-
cause there’s a gate at Kariba mining. Said no one should enter the gate. 
Outside this gate, outside the compound where [the youth were accessing 
the sand] the youth themselves decided they should put measures in place to 
prevent [people attacking company property]...no youth should enter Kariba 
compound. After 3 days, if anyone wants to go, should have a ticket. So the 
youth themselves were putting measures in place to protect their prop-
erty....Try their level best to secure property of the mining company, 
(Gunpoint Youth/No.11 [Interview 98]).  
 
This was therefore not an act of chaotic plunder. On the one hand, it was understood by 
youths involved to be a legitimate act of claiming their rights to employment and develop-
ment. On the other, the leadership, and a great many of the youth (participant and non-) 
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were clearly conscious that what they were doing was illegal, but that it was necessary to 
take action in order to compel the party and from the local authorities to take action. Using 
all of the resources at their disposal, including flags, sheer numbers, and media appeals, they 
had for a brief period successfully redefined the public space. They had reframed the argu-
ment, drawing uncomfortable connections between chiefs and SLPP, they had shamed and 
pressured the APC into acting on a promise it had likely realize was not possible to keep. 
Not least, they had physically commandeered the space they had been prevented from ac-
cessing, and many had even started finding diamonds, (Central Youth/No.11 [Interview 
60]). They had experienced a fleeting moment of strategic agency.   
 
4.4 Turning point 
 The act was intended to influence rather than to defeat government. Unilaterally tres-
passing and taking the gravel was only possible in the short term, and required winning 
government support. To the extent that they needed government support, and that they 
feared the return to war, leaders had no intention of taking on law enforcement agencies, 
although some elements resisted.  
 After it became clear that negotiation was not an option, the police and military were 
called to the site to put a stop to the illegal action. They used tear gas to disperse the youth. 
Forty youth leaders were brought to the police station, and thirty11 were charged with incit-
ing the attack, and for suspected possession of an AK47, (Kamara 7 May 2008). They where 
they were asked to talk down their followers from the violence that was spreading through 
the town. Command structures still in place from the war appeared, among some youth, to 
be utilized to mobilize and demobilize the youth, though this was not explicitly referred to. 
One of the arrested youth leaders, a locally notorious ex-combatant, referred to as an “APC 
Youth Leader” in the Concord Times12, explained: 
Police invite me to the station...We are the elders of the youths. When I 
talked to them [the other youth], they stopped to be violent, (Central Youth 
/No.11 Leader [Interview 30]).  
 
                                                 
11
 Or five, according to the Kono District Magistrate. 
12
 Though referred to as the APC Youth Leader, he was in fact the leader of the Central Youths. The actual APC Dis-
trict Youth League Chairman who had conducted the BBC interview was not mentioned in this particular article, 
(Kamara 7 May 2008).  
  
 75 
Some youth expressed limits on their willingness to pursue the sand at all costs: 
We wanted to go and fight and burn the police station to release our friends 
and continue to fight for our rights. But we only think that we were just 
from war, and we know the consequences of war. So we don’t want to go 
into any other war again, and this makes us calm down, (No.11 Group 
Leader [Interview 102]). 
 
In the end, the youth were constrained by a lack of exit options, due to the strength of law 
enforcement and the unwillingness of most of their number to risk a return to war. At most, 
this explains perhaps a reluctant end to the struggle. What it does not explain is the inconsis-
tency in discourse and behaviour that followed the attack. Within two months, youth shifted 
from attempting to pressure the APC party through open confrontation, to embracing it and 
becoming apologists for the VP, who had owned a share of their anger during the strike, and 
bore significant responsibility for having made the original untenable promise.13  
 Connections smacking of political opportunism by party elites surfaced after the 
event, starting with the release on bail of the arrested youth by the APC candidate for Dis-
trict Council. Given the timing of these events - less than three months before the date of the 
local elections - and the significance of the elections to the VP, and of the results in Kono 
District in particular, it seems a safe assumption that subsequent actions of the youth were 
influenced by the strategic objectives of those seeking power. The formal apology by the 
youth, to the VP and First lady, was a dramatic u-turn from their original confrontational 
stance. The fact that an entire delegation of about fifteen or so of these youth - not just those 
in the APC leadership - then travelled to Freetown to seek their forgiveness, reveals a fear 
on the part of the youth of having their bridges burned with these powerful patrons. One 
youth who joined the delegation described the tone of the visit:  
2:…when VP heard that, straight away [he] asked police to stop the work 
because not permitted…So it stop and later [we] make a delegation and 
meet in Freetown…So explain this system we are facing…SLPP govern-
ment talk bad against him! We go there! Because it was hard for us! 
3: Yes. 
1: So VP said you do a very bad thing, so we apologize. Take some time for 
him to accept apology. 
Who apologised? 
                                                 
13
 Kariba’s Director of operations stated that the “blame clearly lies with the VP,” and that the VP had apparently come 
under fire within his party, both for this and for bailing out the arrested youth, (Kariba Operations Director [Interview 
95]). 
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1: We the youth that go to Freetown…15 of us… [names, including Chair-
man and Chairlady of APC Youth League] 
Whom did you speak with? 
1: VP and First Lady. Just apologize because they say we have done a thing 
they are not expecting. He say, let’s still wait, after the Local Council Elec-
tion, he will know what to do. Let us patient, 
(Central Youths/Balance Youth Chair/No.11 [Interview 99]). 
   
The dramatic reversal of the “youth line” towards the APC demonstrated by the official 
apology to the Vice President and First Lady is a puzzling contradiction. Logically, the an-
ger of the youth would have been directed towards those who, at best, had incompetently 
made a promise they couldn’t fulfill, or at worst, cynically made an empty promise to mobi-
lize youth support. However, in quite an opposite reaction, the attitudes of the No.11 youth 
towards the role of the APC and the VP in particular bordered on apologetic and reverent in 
the weeks around the local elections. Their forgiving attitude towards the new APC regime 
had an equal measure of hostile anti-SLPP rhetoric, which often resurfaced in connection 
with the provocative statement by the SLPP honourable for Kono. Several youth referred to 
propaganda and insults against the VP, who was, in their opinion, being unfairly attacked by 
the SLPP party. As illustrated in the statement below, the VP was extremely popular among 
the youth by the time I was collecting data, around the period of the local elections:  
You are not angry with the VP? 
Not the VP. We don’t have any problem with the VP. 
Whom are you angry with? 
The people who sold the sand and started to provoke us again [SLPP].   
[Chief named]? 
He is one of the chief that sold the sand.  
Did they consult the youth? 
No consult the youth. 
Did the VP make a promise? 
No, the VP don’t make a promise, because of that sand. Don’t make that 
promise all this time. Because they [SLPP] have lost the election, that’s 
why they want a strategy to incite the youth. They are the people who want 
to cause problem among the youth, (Gunpoint Youth Chair/No.11 [Inter-
view 97]). 
 
The completely uncritical tone the No.11 youth adopted with regard to the VP undermines 
the perception that they retained any of independence that they may have had when they 
launched the strike on the sand. In the next section, I explain how the reversal of their be-
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haviour is explained by the hope of new promises, tied to the local election. All that was 
needed was to support the VP’s party, and patience. 
 
4.5 Explaining the turnaround - new promises 
 If the No.11 strike revealed a subversive strategic agency on the part of youth, by the 
time of the local elections, their agency had been aligned completely with that of the APC 
party, to an even greater degree than during the 2007 General Election, the outcome of 
which had been more uncertain. The local elections followed less than two and a half 
months after the attack on the sansan. By this point all arrested youths had been released on 
bail by politicians and they had entered into the political campaigning, mostly for APC. A 
newcomer in the city who had not known about No.11 would have seen little to indicate that 
the relationship between the youth and the APC had recently been strained. In the couple 
weeks before the 6 July 2008 Local Elections took place, it was already clear which party 
was likely to dominate within the city, and even the district. Only APC posters were visible 
around the city. The only SLPP and symbols that had not been torn down were ones on the 
inside of shops that could be locked up and ones on the T-shirts of a few bold candidates. 
For a district which had, since the war, supported SLPP and which had remained an SLPP 
stronghold during the recent General Election, while the majority of the country underwent 
a political sea change in favour of the APC, the visibility of APC youth in the streets in the 
weeks leading up to 5 July 2008 sporting party T-shirt, kerchiefs and colours, was evidence 
that this sea change had now come to Kono. Other party supporters, notably SLPP support-
ers, tended to stay below the radar.  
 Now that the VP had returned the position back to the Chairman, the APC Youth 
League was able to play a significant role in mobilizing the youth. The Chairman referred to 
his direct line with the VP on several occasions, and helped to clarify why the VP had re-
gained such strong support among the youth in the district: 
I spoke with the VP Sam Sumana on several occasions. Jobs are coming.  
Do you believe that? 
Yes, of course. I believe in my leadership.  
What sector are the jobs coming in? 
Road construction...he told me to prepare 1000 youths to engage in jobs. 
Have you recruited? 
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They are on standby...A youth organization under my umbrella. Under the 
District Youth League, linked to the APC party. So [we will] consider them 
first before others, (APC Youth League Chairman/No.11 [Interview 16]). 
 
My interest in the “political youth” groups had been sparked by this admission that not only 
was the party planning job creation, but also job distribution. As I began to meet with some 
of the groups he had listed in the coming weeks, what emerged was that most were small 
community youth groups who did mainly monthly street cleaning, where they would set up 
roadblocks and tax passing traffic. Some also raised funds by organizing shows and all had 
a system of self-taxation through monthly membership fees. Many also had small plots of 
land where they grew food for their own consumption, and for several in the city centre, of-
fice space consisted of burned out houses where some members also lived. Few were regis-
tered or had maintained their annual registration with the Ministries of Social Welfare or of 
Youth and Sports, and many were dismissed by formal CSOs as transient “political youth” - 
groups that had sprung up around the elections and that would disintegrate just as quickly 
afterwards. But among the youth, some of these were well known, in particular, the Central 
Youth Development Organization (commonly “Central Youths”) which had members who 
recalled its early beginnings under the NPRC regime with a role in community defense and 
cleaning, (Central Youths/Balance Youth Chair/No.11 [Interview 99]). Many youth, when 
asked who were the youth leaders in their areas, would name the leaders of their own or-
ganization, and some knew of no others.  
 I had spent more time talking with the Central Youths, as well as the Gunpoint 
Youth, and the No.9 Youth Farmers though I had also talked with the leaders of the Balance 
Youth, the Community Friendship Organisation (also known as Bhagdad), Tankoro Youth 
Organization and Konos Park Youth, initially selecting groups because of their inclusion 
among those listed off by the APC Youth Chairman for the District. Of these, the ones in 
the city centre (Central, Balance, Gunpoint) in particular had a membership that had partici-
pated in No.11, and to a greater or lesser extent, took part in campaigning for the local elec-
tion. Only Bhagdad, was openly political, supporting SLPP, with other groups claiming po-
litical neutrality. Some were legitimate CSOs, but others were considered “political youth” 
or “political groups” that had been set up for the elections.  
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 Of those youth who crossed over from No.11 to campaigning for APC, I found most 
were officially unemployed, finding work in seasonal mining, and through their community 
groups, small scale agriculture. Referring to the twenty odd people who had gathered to take 
part in the discussion, the Central Youth members described their status in this way: 
All here are without a job. Some of us are ex-service. I’m a retired soldier 
but have not benefited any useful, (Central Youths [Interview 31]).  
 
I cannot speak as to the range of income generating activities that the No.11 vigilante min-
ers were involved in, but among the campaigners in general, there were also traders, bike 
riders, motorcycle fitters and other informal sector workers.  
 In addition to local opinion that some were political campaign groups, there was also 
the evidence, among several of these groups, in the form of the prolific APC party branding 
on posters and most T-shirts present (with no other party logos). It was therefore surprising 
when the members vociferously objected to being linked (as a group) to any sort of political 
campaigning activities. Members presented themselves as legitimate community develop-
ment organizations, with membership figures, activities, plans for project proposals, and in 
one case, their own constitution. The message was unequivocal that they honoured the indi-
vidual rights of members to support the party of their choosing. By way of explanation, re-
peatedly organizations offered that they supported “the government of the day”.  
 
4.6 The VP’s impartial supporters 
 The 2008 Local Council Elections in Kono revealed the continued importance of po-
litical fence-sitting, but not through mercurial shape shifting between parties. With the out-
come fairly certain, and fewer benefits on offer at rallies than during the general elections, 
there was no benefit to be gained from practicing watermelon politics. Most youth made a 
decisive switch to the APC party, pinning their hopes on the promises the party was now 
emphasizing - electricity, better roads and agricultural development. APC supporters ruled 
the streets of Koidu. The one exception to their bold support seemed to take place when 
they were gathered in community groups and were confronted by my curiosity about their 
political affiliations. The normal response was that they supported “the government of the 
day.”  
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 In contrast to more established and legitimate (and occasionally funded) youth CSOs, 
discourse on support for the government of the day was common among the “political” 
youth groups. This statement normally preceded an explanation of the group’s non-partisan 
status. It was generally asserted that there was no conflict of interest in supporting the gov-
ernment of the day, and being a neutral youth organization. In practice, this meant that 
groups did nothing to discourage their members from wearing party symbols (normally or 
the ruling party) or taking part in rallies.  
 It revealed a tactical fluidity of partisan affiliation that facilitated their access to 
benefits that was couched in terms of loyalty to the government. It proclaimed loyalty to the 
government (rather than to a specific party), while masking a tactical fluidity of partisan af-
filiation which facilitated their access to benefits. These benefits were both tangible and an-
chored in the present, in the form of small donations from campaigners, and future-based, in 
the promise of jobs and project funding. This principle had also applied during the 2007 
General Elections, during which impartiality had translated into accepting tokens from run-
ning candidates without discriminating between donating parties.14 Use of the term therefore 
did not signify ideological motivation or loyalty to a party, but denoted, rather, transient 
support of incumbent power holders. It implied that loyalty was attached to a given office, 
rather than to the occupying party, and that support would end when elected officials ceased 
to occupy the seat of power.  
 To many of these groups, the phrase itself was a sufficient and logical explanation of 
their apparent partisanship. This much is evident from the following extract of a conversa-
tion I had with a former street girl turned petty trader in perfumes, and who was now the 
chairlady of one of the community youth groups in the town centre that had been actively 
involved in campaigning for APC:   
Why [does your group support]APC? 
Because government of the day. 
Before APC, did you support SLPP? 
We were also supporting SLPP because government of the day at that time. 
Why good for support government of the day? 
Because have all power in their hands and oversee everybody… The reason 
our group is called “Balance” [is that we have a balance of political sup-
porters] some APC, some SLPP and some PMDC. All come back to APC 
                                                 
14
 One trade association, which had benefited from cement and roofing tiles for its office, had justified the contributions 
on the basis that they had come from different parties, and that it was in fact being neutral.   
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though because government of the day, (Balance Youths Chairlady [Inter-
view 44]).   
 
The response contains a degree of ambiguity, in that it suggests that members may in fact 
hold varying allegiances, but at the same time, that all “come back to” the government of 
the day. It is taken to illustrate the fluidity of political allegiance, which for a majority of 
youth is based on the likelihood of a party winning. And in the context of Local Elections, 
this outcome was pre-determined by the APC’s incumbency.  
 Similarly, among the Central Youth, who denied partisanship, a discussion with 
members revealed similar reasoning:  
1: We believe we are with the government of the day. Youth are not politi-
cians, but we do play a role in politics, in terms of develop-
ment…agriculture… Local election time is important. Means power for the 
people – grassroots. When you make a decision for yourself. Need to vote 
for someone…with easy access…who know our needs. They are the ones 
who will talk [to] the central government. 
Does APC know your needs? 
2: Government of the day! They know our needs, (Central Youths [Inter-
view 31]). 
  
The response exemplifies how many of these youth saw themselves very much as imple-
mentors (e.g.“tacticians”) of decisions already taken by politicians (e.g.“strategists”). The 
dependent position of youth also comes across with the reference to the need for “someone 
with easy access.” This statement captures the assumption that a local government member 
representing the same party as the ruling government will have easier access in decision 
making and resource distribution. The name at the end of the long political chain of access 
was normally that of the Vice President, Sam Sumana: 
2: In the past we had youth of Solo B [Solomon Berewa]. Now we have the 
youth of Sam Sumana. …Most of their [youth] leaders were SLPP. 
3: So after election everybody, all the youth man, they belong to present 
APC. 
1: So everybody must come under the present government. 
2: Everyone who want to be a youth must…[come under the] government 
of the day. 
Why is it important to support the government of the day? 
2: Because government of the day they facilitate them, 
(Central Youths/Balance Youth Chair/No.11 [Interview 97]). 
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Significantly, support for the government of the day was at the same time seen as both a po-
litical manoeuver, and a claim of neutrality. Community youth groups navigating the tem-
poral landscape of politics and civil society often engaged in contradictory behaviour – 
showing all the signs of political campaign groups while simultaneously claiming legiti-
macy through their alleged impartiality and engagement in community development activi-
ties. In this context, shape shifting became a matter of shifting from political to apolitical 
group identities.   
 Visiting the meeting place of the Central Youth, a youth group that counted itself as 
one of the most active in the District, such contradictions were glaring. They gathered, in 
fluctuating numbers, in the roofless burned out houses in the centre of the town. In the pe-
riod leading up to the Local Election many of the members wore APC party T-shirts, and 
APC posters were mounted onto otherwise bare concrete walls. The group discussed its 
support of the government of the day, and its involvement in monthly street cleaning exer-
cises and small-scale agriculture and poultry farming, and its plans for submitting project 
proposals after the elections, (Central Youths [Interview 31]).   
 But when asked whether it was political, members adamantly insisted that they were 
non-political – they were a youth development organisation. But other members of the 
community - officials, civil society organizations, and private citizens alike - tended to as-
sociate the names of these groups with negative politics, referring to them as “political 
youth”, “campaign groups” and even “bad boys”. Reference to the government of the day 
therefore conceivably enabled such youth groups to rationalize their support for political 
candidates while simultaneously projecting the status of a (once) registered youth group and 
legitimate member of civil society eligible to receive aid. Politics was only a transient phase 
which came with its opportunities, and then passed: 
Everybody is belonging to a party. When election come, everybody go to 
his party til after election, (Central Youth/No.11 [Interview 60]).   
 
As if to confirm the transient nature of their political engagement, when I returned to visit 
their meeting place after the election for four days in a row, it was deserted of all of its pre-
vious activity. Only late in the evening, at the end of the work week, did the small rooms 




4.6.2 Understanding “the government of the day”  
 The government of the day is not an expression that was invented by these youth 
groups, but one that originated in the division of powers between the institution of the chief-
taincy and the central government. According to the Ministry of Local Government, chiefs 
owe their commitment to whichever party is in power, even though in practice “chiefs are 
rarely so apolitical”, (Jackson 2006, 101). Taken at face value, by evoking the discourse on 
the government of the day youth groups were demonstrating their subscription to principles 
of political neutrality and legitimacy, and by extension, were acknowledging the taboo of 
being politicized. But at the heart of it, the discourse of the government of the day reveals a 
concern for access to patronage that is shared by chiefs and youth alike. In practice, during 
elections, politicians rely on chiefs to mobilize grassroots support. Chiefs, in return rely on 
their patrons in the central government for a source of income to fuel their own local pa-
tronage networks, (Jackson 2006, 101.) As one chief I spoke with put it:  
The Paramount Chief is not supposed to be neutral but [to support] 
AGIP: Any Government In Power.[...]  
I don’t understand, what happens during periods of political transition? 
People keep changing like chameleons. My chiefdom, I want good roads, 
schools...Who is going to provide?[...]To be very honest, if you are not 
with the government, they will not [support] you. So for 5 years people 
are going to [get] punished. You have to [support] that government. Not 
for your own selfish interests, because your people will suffer.[...]I have 
my own reasons for supporting APC, (Paramount Chief [Interview 49]).   
 
The principle of supporting AGIP, and the question of whether this means refraining from 
all political involvement or using one’s position of power to campaign, is therefore, in prac-
tice, open to interpretation. This grey area is exploited by chiefs. During the local elections, 
with the APC party in power at the central level, it was possible for chiefs who supported 
local APC candidates to engage in behind-the-scenes campaigning while in fact supporting 
the government of the day. It is widely believed that chiefs continue to use their leverage 
with the local population to mobilize support, even if not all incidents are reported.15  
 For the youth groups who felt compelled to justify the prominence of APC party 
symbols in their ostensibly neutral spaces as well as the small but significant benefits de-
                                                 
15
  In two interviews young SLPP candidates recounted being pressured by chiefs to step down. 
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rived from politics,16 reference to the government of the day enabled them to exploit this 
same grey area. The implication could be that it was acceptable to support the APC party for 
the local elections, because this was in fact the party in power at the national level. Couch-
ing their practice in such terms enabled these groups to pursue political patronage while the 
claiming neutrality of a legitimate civil society organization, eligible for registration and 
funding.     
 But the comparison between chiefs and youth ends there. Paramount chiefs are in a 
relationship of mutual dependence with political party elites, and can leverage their power 
accordingly, in a strategic manner. In contrast, I observed that the youth who are the cam-
paign foot-soldiers, were in a far greater position of dependency, hanging on the hope of 
electoral promises. In the context of the failed attack on the No.11 site, and the subsequent 
official apology to the chief patron of the district, their loyal discourse on the government of 
the day can be understood as reaffirming their position of dependency. Many of these same 
groups tried to cash in the promises of the government of the day, by making official re-
quests for jobs and support to agricultural development.17 
 Therefore, on its own, the lack of attachment to any particular party inherent in sup-
porting the government of the day seems to grant youth groups a level of independence from 
the political game, in a similar way to the above-noted electoral behaviour of youth in the 
2007 General Election. But placed in the context of the story of No.11, during which youth 
voiced their anger with the ruling government for reneging on its promise to release to them 
the valuable sand, the incongruent discourse on the government of the day speaks, rather, to 
the strength of patrimonial relations and the sway that such relations continue to exert over 
the political behaviour of youth. 
 
4.7 The practice of supporting the government of the day 
 Discourse on the government of the day corresponded with the internal dynamics of 
some of these groups, which went through their own internal power struggles in the period 
ahead of elections in order to align their internal leadership with the ruling party. I had spo-
                                                 
16
 During the General Election, benefits were larger, including bags of cement and zinc roofing panels for one large 
association from 2 different parties; during the local elections groups still received contributions from campaigners as 
well as food during rallies. 
17
 Many of these groups also lacked the capacity to make project proposals, but all discussed plans to deliver their pro-
posals to the newly elected local councillors after the elections were over.  
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ken with three youth leaders who had experienced such internal revolts against their leader-
ship, and a fourth whom I suspect experienced similar forces in the call for his resignation. 
Others had also apparently faced similar pressures to resign. In these cases, the old leader-
ship was branded as SLPP-supporting, although only in one case did the leader in question 
actually have a fixed affiliation with SLPP, the others had also subsequently converted to 
APC. Such transitions therefore tended to appear more personally opportunistic for chal-
lengers than strategic for the group as a whole. The role of political patrons was apparent in 
at least one of these cases, as explained below.  
    In the clearest example, this change of leadership was simultaneously demanded 
from below and encouraged from above. The former chairman of the Central Youth told this 
story. He had been an SLPP supporter, and had been chairman of the youth group for three 
years, and his group had, he said, benefited from patronage from the then VP, Solomon 
Berewa. I had later spoken with a Ministry of Youth and Sports Official who had recalled 
working with him and the group, by providing recommendations for the group to use fields 
for football matches, and to rent halls to hold fund-raising shows (discos). He explained that 
during the time of his chairmanship, the group had not been actively political:  
That time we were not political. That’s why I resigned. Because the youth 
have become more political. Since just after the election. Presently, APC-
SLPP youth fighting each other. Before I was working with the group there 
were different political parties in my group. And the boys were cooperating 
with me. When any one get a problem with the police, I go there and do my 
best. I was able to control them. Just after the election, some of these APC 
youth come in. …They accuse me of being SLPP youth chairman, (Central 
Youth/No.11 [Interview 60]).  
  
Just after the General Election, there was an influx of new members into the organisation, 
all supporting the APC party, pushing membership up, he estimated, from around 80 to over 
100 members. They sacked him, and elected a new chairman, a current member.  With ech-
oes of what would happen during No.11, a delegation had then gone to Freetown to the Vice 
President to present the new leader. According to this ousted leader, internal alignments had 
happened with other community youth organisations during the same interim-election pe-
riod.   
 The new leader who replaced him was the same notorious ex-combatant who had 
been among those arrested during No.11. Some speculated that this appointment was a po-
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litical reward for his loyalty to the APC party, (Central Youth [Interview 92]) which in-
cluded a stint as the personal body personal bodyguard to the Vice President, and prior to 
that providing security for a Mayoral candidate when APC was not popular. Among the 
members of the organisation, he was the only youth leader they recognised. By outsiders, he 
was often referred to as a rebel, or as a killer or drug addict and several informants recalled 
an incident some months back when this leader had stabbed someone at the Opera Junction 
in the centre of the town, with speculation that it related to money. I had asked him early on 
why he had run for chairman, and he responded that the initiative had not been his own:  
I don’t decide, the youth decide. They find out I am fit and capable to be 
leader. ...Appointed me. They make me to go to Community Centre Hall 
with elders there and all the youth... The youth and the elders decided to-
gether, (Central Youth Chair/No.11 [Interview 30]).   
 
The supportive role of political patrons was raised again another conversation with a group 
member who was an SLPP supporter:  
The VP change leader of Central Youths, so he change all the leaders. All 
the strong organisations in Kono he change all the leaders. 
Which? 
Even the Driver’s Union…the Diamond Dealer’s Association, the leader 
was changed. VP tell them [the youth group members] since [endorsed 
group leader] is for APC he started campaigning [endorsed group leader]. 
Because I am the government of the day, so if you want development, give 
support to [endorsed group leader]. 
Did the VP come to the Central Youths election? 
No he…[said] If you vote for [endorsed group leader] you are still support-
ing the APC party. In terms of development it can help. 
Who said this speech? 
The Diamond Dealer’s chairman. He’s the one that make the speech. 
When? 
Immediately after the [2007 general] election,  
(Central Youth [Interview 92]).   
 
Clearly this example was part of a larger pattern of political realignment involving the spon-
sorship of specific candidates by political patrons. Confirming this trend, a key informant 
explained his expectation that groups that had not already done so would realign themselves 
again after the Local Election had confirmed the turnover towards APC:  
Now it is Ernest Bai Koroma, a new leader, a new party APC, so you are 
expecting youth groups to call another election. Youth groups with us in 
SLPP regime, now APC regime… 
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How often are there elections? 
Most times happen alongside General Election. After every Local Council 
Election the youth groups do another election for themselves. There must 
be a councilor that is representing the youths on the council, so he might 
call up an election for all registered youth groups. 
Where does the initiative for youth group elections come from? 
…Councillor may call or [youth may initiate], (Hill Station/Central Youth 
[Interview 73]).   
 
Regardless of the level of formality of these elections, the essential point is that it is not an 
unusual practice for youth to align their groups with the politics of patrons, in this case, the 
Vice President. One youth leader put it more bluntly:  
The most active youth group in Kono District must be part of politicians. 
All the other youth groups are dormant. In days of SLPP, talk ‘Bhagdad, 
Bhagdad...’ [his organisation] Now APC and [everyone talks about] Central 
Youths, (Community Friendship Organisation Chair [Interview 41]).   
 
The manifestations of government support were not always positive. Levels of electoral in-
timidation and violence were considered relatively low during the local election, (UN News 
Service 2008). With a strong non-violence movement as the backdrop, electoral violence 
was highly stigmatized. Nonetheless, in addition to one open incident of violence on the 
SLPP rally day, there were numerous such reports of intimidation and targeted acts of vio-
lence in the media and with the police of intimidation, particularly against candidates and 
supporters of SLPP and independents, (Massaquoi 2008). The belief that a chain of com-
mand connected chiefs, politicians, including the VP himself, to political youths was com-
mon. Two of the young candidates I spoke with reported that they had experienced pressure, 
threats and intimidation to step down, including by one of the Gbense chiefs. One also re-
counted receiving a death threat from the leader of one of the political youth groups: 
I was called by the chiefs and VP to step down. He [the VP] called me 
through the chiefs.  
Which chief?  
Chief [name]. He called me, but I refused to went there. [He went on to ex-
plain how he’d also received threats from his fellow youths:] ‘If you don’t 
step down, we will cut your head.’ In fact, [youth group leader] is one of 
these guys. Said it on three occasions. ... All are [from the same youth 
group], but [the leader] is the only ex-combatant.... They say I should step 
down in the interest of the VP, because the VP is from Kono. I reported to 
the police. They told me they would abuse my mother. If I didn’t step 
down, they will see me as an enemy to the VP. I said this is democracy and 
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I have my civic right. No amount of intimidation will stop me. I am the only 
candidate who used to come to the central area every day. Others are 
afraid... (SLPP Candidate/CFO [Interview 53]).  
 
The youth administering these threats had adopted the VP’s victory as their own personal 
objective, and were committed to bringing about this end, through violence if necessary. 
Ironically, at least one of these youth had also participated as a speaker in a public peace 
rally alongside politicians that I had had the chance to attend.  In such incidents, it was clear 
that youth were not the instigators, as was explained to this candidate by his former tormen-
tor: 
Yesterday [the same youth group leader] met me. He started apologising to 
me, let me forget about it. The election is over now. He was just doing that, 
he was sent by their leaders.  
What leader?  
[Name], [APC] aspirant for District Council Chairperson, 
(SLPP Candidate/CFO [Interview 53]).  
 
The same politician, whom the youth alleged had stood the assurity for their release on bail 
after the No.11 attack, was also the one named in connection with this incident.  
 On the side of the opposition, the youth organisation with strong SLPP leadership 
spoke of its own role in “defending” party rally days from the encroachment of the domi-
nant APC: 
Sometimes they will say SLPP date 25th for rally and will see other party 
wants to intervene. The youth will take part to defend the party at that time. 
Because usually give a calendar date for every political party. Party will 
give bad boys… youth drugs that is the time when we will defend SLPP. 
[…] If you have a date to make a rally, it’s your place to defend. That is 
when young people are necessary in supporting parties, because youth are 
the most targeted people for all the parties, (Community Friendship Organi-
sation Chair [Interview 41]).   
 
This statement reflects the fact that many youth were aware of their indispensable man-
power, yet they were also not blind to the manipulation of parties who used them to achieve 






4.8 Narratives of exploitation 
 At the same time, many youth expressed a sense of exploitation by politicians, who 
they felt abandoned them as soon as their manpower was no longer needed, after elections.  
I had heard repeated the familiar refrain that politicians only ‘use, abuse and refuse us,’ 
which is also used among youth in Freetown, as documented by Christensen and Utas 
(2008, 532). As this young man waiting for used tires to repair observed:   
[They] only use youth during campaigns. During politics. Now [we are] 
frustrated sitting here. During campaigning, people come, but now nobody 
come. [We are] disgruntled and hungry, things are getting expensive, (Car 
Park Workers [Interview 63]). 
 
Narratives of exploitation were repeated by members of some youth groups. These 
tended to express a relative powerlessness vis-a-vis politicians, upon whom they 
relied for the realisation of promises. Although, under the circumstances, these nar-
ratives were more commonly directed towards SLPP, they were part of a wider 
theme of exploitation and abandonment by politicians after elections, from which 
APC was not exempt.18 
They only use youth in politics. That is why you heard of so many youth 
groups. But after politics, give no time or attention to the youths. One of the 
key factors that kicked out SLPP. So even for now, you are just waiting til 
after the Local Council Election, if this other system of government will lis-
ten or care this time. Or by re-electing this new executive, if the new mem-
bers will do the same thing, (Hill Station/Central Youth [Interview 73]). 
 
1: We never know that before [political campaign groups] 
2: It’s the SLPP government that created all that. We never know that be-
fore in Kono District. So when APC come, say ‘let’s form our own 
group’...But before first APC or NPRC we never know that ‘NPRC Youth’, 
‘APC Youth’. No! For 10 years ‘SLPP Youth’....Create beaucoup misun-
derstanding among us. People take this like religion, (Central 
Youths/Balance Youth Chairman/No.11 [Interview 99]).  
 
The cost of improving one’s future prospects, as the above statement illustrates, went be-
yond potential, or even likely, abandonment after elections, but involved conflict with other 
youth. The aforementioned examples of intimidation and forced realignment of leadership 
illustrate the type of division that politics could bring about. “After politics,” however, I was 
                                                 
18
 Although Kono has a long history of involving youth groups for political campaigning and violence, as explained in 
Chapter 3, many of these youth were not around to recall this earlier history, and only looked as far back as the military 
regime under NPRC. 
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told at several junctures, there was more connect than to divide these youth. The effect of 
elections in magnifying and creating division is one explored in detail by Christensen and 
Utas (2008). Although their study underlines factors that were specific to their target group 
(ex-combatants remobilised for the 2007 elections), such as pre-existing factional divisions, 
and a more deep-seated mistrust of politicians due to their post-war experiences of impris-
onment, elections clearly reinforced these divisions and heightened their insecurity. 
While the costs of their relationship with parties were, to a large extent, masked by their en-
thusiasm for the VP, scratching below the surface revealed their doubts and fears, and that 
partnership in politics was, to a large extent, borne of necessity rather than conviction.  
 
4.9 The elusive benefit from politics 
 The air around the local elections was expectant with promise. There was much an-
ticipation that with their grievances now registered at the highest levels by the attack on No. 
11, after the local elections there would be change. The prospect of employment was by far 
the most hoped for benefit, although electricity, running water, and the repairs to road to 
Matotoka (connecting them to Freetown) were close runners-up.  
What now? 
…VP said ‘let us keep our fingers crossed, everything [will be] ok 
for us.’ The sand belong to us. We have a procedure to work, which 
is going to be a peaceful procedure. Not only that sand is our devel-
opment for Kono, there is so many development…After Local 
Council [elections] he’s going to bring so many development for we 
the youth in Kono District, (Central Youth/No.11 [Interview 47]). 
 
As this statement clearly shows, the message for the youth to abandon their violent tactics 
carried a lot of weight, coming from their brother the VP. He had instructed them to wait 
rather than to agitate, and had promised development, and not least, employment. Several 
informants had used the term patienting in referring to this period of waiting for future 
prospects to materialize, underscoring their lack of control: 
[After] Local Council Elections, he [the VP] will know what to do. Let us 
patient. Until local election finish. ‘I will know what to do for the 
sand.’...[Distribution of the sand is] one of the first programme on our 
agenda. Second, agriculture. Third, youth employment, (Central 




 The aspirations for benefit of APC supporting youth ran high with youth anticipating 
that ‘jobs are on the way’. Many clung to the hope that the sand would be released to the 
youth, others saw ahead to jobs in welding, carpentry, agriculture, and even driving. De-
cember 2008 was mentioned as a possible time horizon, (Central Youths/No.11 [Interview 
78]). Many youth groups prepared project proposals and letters requesting job recommenda-
tions for submission to the new local councilors and other local authorities after the elec-
tions. In one example, the Kono Bike Rider’s Union had not only written a project proposal 
for an agricultural project, but had also written letters to a number of key officials and poli-
ticians, including the VP, requesting the recommendation of their members, who did not 
earn a reliable income through bike riding, for employment with Koidu Holdings, (Annex 
2). Similar requests had been made (or were being developed) by the street cleaning youth 
groups for jobs with the mining companies. It was already clear that most of these requests 
would not materialize, especially in a context where several of the companies had recently 
laid off staff.  A number of groups also spoke of proposals for funding for agricultural pro-
jects. While several had received plots of land from the chiefdoms, it was less clear what 
their prospects would be for obtaining funding through what appeared to be mainly non-
formalized channels, often linking in some way to the VP. The APC Youth League itself 
had apparently recently received 1000 acres of land and some bushels of rice and was now 
looking for funding. In addition, many of these groups had not written project proposals be-
fore, let alone held bank accounts, or any experience in managing the comparatively large 
project funds. Clearly the shift towards agriculture had originated from above, and with 
good reason. There simply wasn’t the absorptive capacity in the mining sector for the all of 
the youth who needed employment. Furthermore, it was an expensive contradiction for such 
a fertile country to import its rice while many of its people continued to go to sleep hungry. 
While many youth continued to hope for the release of No.11, they had also embraced the 
possibility of finding work in agriculture, and were now tactically navigating their way 
through shifting political priorities. Political patrons, therefore, provided not only a potential 
source of funds, recommendations, or even direct employment, but also the targets for 
which to aim. When the message came that agriculture, rather than mining, was the way of 
the future for Kono, youth groups embraced the opportunity to reinvent themselves (or re-
vive old skills) as professional farmers.   
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 The need for ‘recommendations’ was considered a normal and logical part of fund-
ing- and job-hunting. As the APC Youth League Chairman explained, his responsibility was 
to present various funding requests to the newly formed Local Council. It was logical that 
funding requests would be channeled through the APC representative, as SLPP had had its 
time when its supporters were favoured. However, this was not to say that groups had to ac-
tively support the APC to be eligible for recommendations: 
You have youth groups all operating under APC Youth League. Some are 
non-political...[groups] come through me as youth leader and I present their 
case to the Council. And you need that recommendation from the District 
Youth League. Then I can pursue the matter, present to the Mayor...The 
majority of them [youth groups] were under SLPP and got funding from 
SLPP, and now SLPP gone. So how can they get this funding unless they 
go through [me]? So [they] have [to get] the recommendation of the Youth 
Leader to the District/City Council, (APC District Youth League Chair-
man/No.11 [Interview 98]).    
 
Most groups seemed to know of few other alternatives for accessing funding. With little do-
nor presence, and only one slow-running and expensive internet office in the city, it was un-
surprising that most of the youth groups had no independent capacity to obtain funding, and 
avidly sought for advice on this. 
 However, the political message that jobs were on the way was clear from several 
conversations I’d had with APC leaders. In more than one case, it was suggested that youth 
groups represented a basic unit for dispersing work opportunities, as was explained by an 
aspirant APC Local Councilor:  
I want to mobilize my youth for jobs when government comes in for 
youth employment. I want government to demand manpower. 
What do you mean by mobilise?  
Getting by youth groups because all this town is divided into youth 
groups. In my own strategy I’ve divided [this town] into youth 
groups. I work with the chairman of Konos Park, I get them all on 
the phone, “I want us to target x street today in …” …they will come 
out, (APC Candidate [Interview 46]). 
 
The fact that recruitment was discussed in such candid terms by political party members re-
veals the degree to which such distribution arrangements were considered normal and ex-
pected - both among politicians and youth. Accessing this network was an object youth tried 
to achieve by belonging to groups, and by demonstrating their commitment to the govern-
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ment of the day during the elections. But as much as there could be benefits attached to sup-
porting the government of the day, the reverse was also true - being on the wrong side in-
curred a cost. Youth who supported SLPP were in the minority, and many kept their affilia-
tion to themselves. The fear of being cut off from patronage networks had very real implica-
tions, as confessed by one SLPP supporting youth, after asking us to relocate to a more pri-
vate place: 
I am a strong SLPP supporter. So it makes it hard to submit propos-
als now. People know me as a strong SLPP supporter. Because my 
own party lost the election…All the seats for this Local Council 
Election won by APC - the area that I can ask for help. Now when I 
write a proposal to local government, those are now APC people so 
it is not easy to push my project forward, (Central Youth [Interview 
93]).  
 
In addition to no longer broadcasting his fixed political affiliation, this particular youth was 
also a member of the Central Youths – one of the groups which during the period of the 
general and local elections had been dominated, indeed taken over, by APC members. How-
ever, he had apparently chosen to remain a member, even after the previous SLPP chairman 
had been removed. For youths in this position, concealing one’s political identity was as 
much a crucial part of navigating the changed political playing field, as was his membership 
of the organization that would increase his chances of getting funding. Marginalization due 
to politics was also experienced on an organizational level. The leader of “Bhagdad,” with 
his fixed SLPP leadership, explained how, with the turnover of power, his group had lost a 
source of patronage: 
For the past government we were taking part in [street] cleaning exercises. 
But since SLPP out, they [APC youth groups] claim the organisation to be 
party supporter, so we stopped. … Central Youths now with ruling party, 
cleaning on Saturdays. We did cleaning on Saturdays in days of SLPP. APC 
brought in their own youths. That always happens when there is a change, 
(Community Friendship Organisation Chairman [Interview 41]).   
 
One of the main activities of these groups is monthly street cleaning exercises. Though not 
normally paid for their efforts, the municipality would sometimes loan them equipment, or 
small funds if possible. These groups would primarily make their money by slowing the 
traffic at ‘checkpoints,’ (Central Youths/Balance Youth/No.11 [Interview 99]). I learned of 
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one group that had split over the control of certain routes. Clearly there were benefits to be 
had from supporting the government of the day.  
 However, even among loyal supporters of the VP, promises were not always ful-
filled. Many rumours circulated about the Central Youth leader who had been among the 
core group of No.11 leaders, and then at the forefront of the local election mobilisation. He 
had ceased to be the leader of the Central Youths while I was there, and had left to take a 
job at the water key in Freetown, allegedly in return for his loyal support. I had tried and 
failed to meet with him in Freetown, but later learned from Sia that he had returned to Ko-
idu shortly afterwards, because there had been no job waiting for him in Freetown.  
 
4.10 Summary and analysis 
 The attack on No.11 represented an attempt by youth to push out the limits of their 
agency and to effect change on an unfair system, rather than to remain affected by it. The 
policies, contracts and rules negotiated by others comprised a “social terrain” of obstacles 
that restricted their ability to navigate their survival. They viewed the post-war regime, the 
company, and a number of the chiefs as complicit actors operating in self-interest at the cost 
of their own rights to work and survive. In the past, some of the luckier ones had been able 
tactically to bend rules and access the sand, but with the sale of the tailings to Kariba, secu-
rity was heightened and the property became off limits. The company, the chiefs, and their 
children continued to benefit while many struggled to find daily mining work as the rainy 
season approached. Now the new government, which had fueled their hope of social justice 
and a better future with its pledge to give them the sand, was threatening to repeat the famil-
iar ritual of promise-breaking after elections.  
 Rather than continuing to wait indefinitely, youth leaders seized their pre-election 
leverage by rallying hundreds upon hundreds to claim their rights, and to pressure the party 
to honour its promise. This was no underhanded attempt to beat the system, but a bold de-
marcation of physical and discursive public space, which placed their pressing needs and 
realities at the centre of the table and commanded the attention, and the action, of those in 
power. They managed, briefly, to impose their will on the APC party leadership and the lo-
cal traditional authorities, demonstrating a strategic agency that was anchored as much in 
their conviction, as it was in the compelling power of their numbers. 
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  However, subsequent events dramatically changed their mode of engagement. After 
the arrest and subsequent release of a core group of the youth by a member of the ruling 
party, more than a dozen of them drove to Freetown to seek the forgiveness of the VP; such 
was their fear of burning bridges with Kono’s highest positioned patron. This reversal was a 
dramatic admission of fault which, along with its highly apologetic discourse, spoke vol-
umes of their weakened position. Returning to Koidu, many of these youth mobilized them-
selves for an APC victory that would bring to fruition the promise of the sand, among many 
others. In this context, discourse on the government of the day showed anything but political 
neutrality - it megaphoned a youth group’s support for the APC party, and the VP specifi-
cally. The acts of ‘campaigning’, alignment of youth group leadership, intimidation and vio-
lence were tactics defined by the imperatives of electoral victory for party leaders.  
 But beneath the rhetoric about APC and the VP, many youth expressed feelings of 
exploitation by politicians, whom they felt used them during elections, luring them in with 
fake promises, only to abandon them afterwards.  Many felt at the mercy of politicians, and 
their hopes for light, for employment, for better futures seemed to be riding entirely on the 
performance of the government of the day. While many expressed little faith in politicians in 
general, doubts and fears tended to be framed in terms of the past, often focusing on SLPP. 
They carefully avoided articulating pessimism about the future. But hope that APC would 
be different, and that jobs would come, was little more than a firmly clutched straw, of a re-
ality over which they did not feel they had any power to influence now that elections were 
over. Few felt part of any wider community, let alone district or national, governance proc-
esses. When asked about their role in decision-making and agenda-setting, with some ex-
ceptions, they tended to elaborate on their physical contributions to development, through 
street cleaning and sensitization. Almost all expressed frustration at being ignored by gov-
ernment outside of election time and being disconnected from official youth leaders.  
 These youth share imaginaries of personal socio-economic emancipation: of jobs that 
can provide them a decent living and self-sufficiency. These continue to be beyond reach. 
The promise of jobs remains distant, and a lack of options means that most look to politi-
cians to bring about these changes. Many have joined youth groups, partly for the security 
net of peer assistance, but also to maximise their chances for job recommendations and 
funding. The “political youth” groups I took an interest in were uncritical of the source - 
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whether from politicians or donors. But their limited capacities for seeking out and obtain-
ing, let alone managing such funds (e.g. from the Youth Basket Fund) makes this prospect 
unrealistic for most. Many continue to hope that the government will intervene with the 
company to “release” the No.11 sand, and that Koidu Holdings will expand its operations. 
In the meantime, while they wait for these prospects, they continue to do what they must for 
grim survival. During elections at least, this means placing the goals of patrons ahead of 
their own, in the hope that theirs come true in the longer term. In this respect, many of these 
youth are shrewd navigators of the political terrain, but their ability to affect the structure of 
the public domain is highly limited.  
 This case reveals how youth perceive their engagement in the public arena in terms 
of physically active contributions, and that, furthermore, their normal modes of participation  
are governed by political imperatives that are not of their own making. The predominant 
tactical agency is exemplified by discourse on the government of the day, which is taken to 
be a shorthand for the opportunistic way in which marginalised youth engage in politics, 
with a view to maximizing short term gains and long term prospects, and to preserving rela-
tions with those in power who have access to resources. In the absence of formal processes 
for influencing decisions and processes, youth resort to subversive activity, as exemplified 
by No.11. However, the possibility that youth were able to momentarily influence decision 
makers through their illegal action was not due to their strategic agency alone. The action 
was, crucially, enabled by configurations of power that heightened their own power over 
patrons.  
 In summary, this case reveals how the lack of alternatives that characterises the situa-
tion of marginalised youth means that their predominant form of agency in the public do-
main continues to be determined by patrimonial concerns, and is therefore tactical. This, in 
turn, limits their capacity to widen or deepen their participation in societal decision-making, 
because effecting such a reform would involve challenging existing power relations, and 










5.1 The limits of youth agency 
 Optimism about the growing moral independence among youth in post-war Sierra 
Leone is well placed. The normalization of acts and behaviours that challenge social norms 
of deference to elders and reciprocity, such as the widespread practice of political 
shapeshifting, reflect how youth culture is diverging from established notions of democracy 
and citizenship that have not benefited them. Such changing values underpin demands for 
social justice and accountability of political leaders that are key to consolidating democracy. 
 On the surface, the practice of watermelon politics and the support for the govern-
ment of the day may appear different; the first involving mercurial shape shifting between 
contending parties, and the latter implying commitment to the party in power. But in fact, 
both behaviours are expressions of tactical agency, driven by short term, pragmatic calcula-
tions of interests in which ideology and loyalty play little part. The use of this language 
shows an advanced way of conceptualizing their interests and legitimizing their actions 
which in itself is positive, and which may be eroding traditional forms of patrimonialism. 
 But to regard this as evidence that patrimonialism is on the way out is misplaced. 
Watermelon politics and the government of the day are merely new forms of patrimonial-
ism, in which clients are less loyal, but no less dependent upon patrons for advancement. In 
other words, the evidence that youth are breaking with tradition to claim their entitlements 
should not be equated with their enhanced agency in the public sphere, in the strategic 
sense. Patrimonialism continues to shape the terrain of politics and employment, and to 
frame, and constrain, the modes of engagement of marginalized youth in particular. It con-
tinues to limit their wider participation in politics, and their role to that of implementors 
rather than decision-makers. Any power or influence they exert ceases to pack any punch 




 Islands of strategic agency, such as the attack on No.11, and the watermelon ‘tricks’ 
of ex-combatants are enabled by political configurations of power which temporarily en-
hance the leverage of youth. Others, such as the entrepreneurialism and independence of as-
sociations, are also undermined by the imperative to support, and to seek the support of the 
government of the day. 
 In other words, the predominant form of agency of youth in the public space, is tacti-
cal. Rather than leading positive change, for instance by joining forces for more responsive 
and accountable political alternatives, youth are too often compelled by poverty and lack of 
alternatives to prop up, and indeed to replicate through their actions and expectations, that 
systems marginalize them. The u-turn on No.11, and the discourse of government of the day 
illustrates this contradiction. 
 
5.2 Patrimonialism as a stabilizing system? 
 A central paradox in this study has been the desire of youth for material independ-
ence, set against the unavoidable need for favourable positioning within patronage networks 
as a means of achieving this. They face an acute lack of options, and to the extent that they 
continue to look to patrons for the realisation of their objectives, they remain tied to the in-
terests of more powerful individuals. This system may be beneficial in a situation where the 
ends and means of patrons are relatively benign, and provided that they can fulfill their 
promises. However, recalling the quotation by McEvoy (2006) in the introduction, the ful-
fillment or not of these promises has a wider significance, including as formative experi-
ences in the post-war socialization of youth. Continued frustration and lack of options for 
improvement could, in time, change the cost-benefit equation in favour of remobilisation in 
the service of patrons with far less benign objectives. Beyond pragmatism, the youth from 
this study expressed hope for “self-reliance” which would free them from their reluctant de-
pendence on politics, and which would enable them to become the socially fulfilled indi-
viduals. 
 The attack on No.11 should also be taken as a warning of the limits of patience, and 
the ability of youth to endure indefinite economic and social waithood while they wait for 
others to take action. Outside of elections, formal processes for participating in decision-
making and accessing funds remain inaccessible to most underemployed, undereducated 
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and patrimonially disconnected youth. In the absence of more effective mechanisms, the re-
sources of marginalized youth can be mobilised with greater impact through informal 
strategies that shift the locus of power in their favour. In the words of one youth, they know 
that they need to “make a big noise” in order for their voices to be heard, (Gunpoint Youth 
Chairman/No.11 [Interview 97]). Violence was not a goal for most youth involved in the 
No.11 attack, though it was clearly a combustible situation. Although the youth backed 
down, their support for the government of the day was no oath of allegiance. The cost of fur-
ther defiance outweighed the potential benefits in 23-27 April 2008, but this equation may 
change, if in time, nothing else does.  
 
5.3 Implications 
 The finding that patrimonialism continues to shape and limit the political engage-
ment and to define the expectations of marginalised youth has implications for program-
ming in the area of youth empowerment. This research reinforces the need for youth pro-
gramming that differentiates between context-specific categories of youth, and roots itself in 
the realities of marginalized youth. The alternative risks further entrenching power relations 
and further alienating the marginalized, by favouring those youth who more articulate, more 
socially engaged and formally organized. For governance, this means going beyond mere 
consultation of youth, and making the space for their strategic agency in shaping and evalu-
ating processes and decisions, (UNDP 2006).  To end with, the most compelling questions 
raised by this research are:  
• Are there examples of sustained strategic agency by marginalized youth?  
• How does patrimonialism manifest itself during the periods between elections? 
• How do youth imagine independence? 
• How has patrimonialism adapted to the increasingly urbanized and group-oriented re-
alities of youth existence in the post-war context?
 
• How can governments and development agencies mitigate the risk that their pro-
grammes inadvertently reinforce patrimonialism and the dependent position of youth? 
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Annex 1. Maps 
 
 








(From Bøås and Hatløy 2006, 26)
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Annex 2. Request for recommendation           
        
As this letter indicates, the income from bike riding is unreliable and insufficient to meet the cost of living. 
Many riders do not earn enough in a day to pay for the cost of bike rental. The Bike Rider’s Association, acts 
to protect and promote their interests, whether advocating for improved roads or licensing systems, fighting 
police harassment or assisting riders who get injured. In addition, as this letter exemplifies, the leader also 
looks out for the wider interests of the members. Copies of this letter were also written to the Chairman of 
the District Youth Coalition, the APC Party Chairman for Kono District, the Paramount Chief for Tankoro, 
the Council of Paramount Chiefs for Kono, the Mines Minister, the Minister of Youth and Sports, and the 
Vice President. 





























Top and middle, the No.11 sand dump. On 23rd 
April 2008 hundreds of youth trespassed and be-
gan removing the sand. The tree at the top of the 
dune marks the area where they erected a red 
flag. 
 
Below, members of a youth group outside of 
their meeting place, most of whom participated 
in the “attack”.  
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Annex 4. Contact Chart 
 
 
Name/description Topic Date & Place Accessed Notes 
1. Visiting Professor 
at Fourah Bay College 
 
07 Elections 20.06 
Spain (Phone) 
Morten Bøås Link youth participation to failure of peace divi-
dend; SLPP vs. APC youth wings; FBC inci-
dent/mirroring and predicting national politics 












Politicization of student politics by ruling party; 
politics and influence are necessary for survival 













Radio station programming – profiling candi-
dates. Audience not just SLPP 










Met in street  Showed me directions and walked around Ftn 
together. Not politically active. Politicians are 
liars. Voted APC in protest against SLPP and 
now there is light. Dropped out of college bc no 
money. Both parents died, lives with support of 
uncle.  











Morten Bøås Remobilization of ex-combatants; positioning of 
researcher; division within mining communities 
6. PMDC youth 
spokesperson, running 
for leadership of youth 
wing 
Youth wing 





PMDC a young man’s party, less hierarchical; 
believes strongly in need to challenge elders 










Participation of young generation; very hierar-
chical from his description, but he does not say 
this. APC sacking of SLPP HQ. Youth politics 
in the 90s.  







and Dev HQ 
Work contact Why UNDP got into youth programmes; Na-
tional youth councils and new commission; poli-
ticization of youth organizations; politics in 
Kono, renegade DYC 











Uses of influence; his populist style (e.g. all the 
things he has done for the community and indi-
viduals); youth mobilized to help him get the 
APC symbol 
10. Leader of National 
Youth Coalition and of 
District Youth Coun-












National Union of Sierra Leone Students 
(NUSS) is not politicized in his opinion, the 
student union elections were free and fair; 
structure and roal of NY Coalition/Council 







Work contact Security situation in Kono 
how far will they go to display political affilia-
tion? 
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12. Director of Opera-
tions & 2 young train-







Position Challenges of youth in running in elections, 
lack of funds; LC position not paid; voting 
behariour of older people & fear of youth; 
youth not united or well organized; kono the 
only district that will sway elections 









A disproportionate number of those who with-
drew their candidacy from local elections were 
from Kono, and gave health reasons. Youth 
mostly associated with violence.  
14. District Elections 











Police fear of being transferred, so must share 
same ideology as ruling party.  












Politicization of chiefs; Kono swing state with 
higher stakes; greater resistance where com-
munities are party strongholds 









Sia/position Promise jobs to APC youth organizations – 
saying APC organisations get priority (and this 
is right) 




UNDP contact Personal story; women in politics; youth rights 
and increased awareness; need for political 
connections; recognition as a strategy to get 
out 
18. APC member 







Brief chat with Sia translating, mainly de-








Kainkordu Rd.  
Sia Intimidation because not APC and bc a 
woman; financial challenge due to being a 
woman and and independent 








Sia/position MOCKY; jobs; political indimidation bad; 
police cowed 









Sia/position DYC no funding from gov; low capacity of 
Ministry Y&S so they didn’t organize elections 
and DYC went ahead with donor funding.  
22. Secretary, Advo-













Advocacy for street girls; DYC has done noth-
ing for the youth; no information on Youth 
Basket Fund (UNDP); frustration with donors 




random Central Youth are political and get paid by 
political parties. When asked which, he said 
both. He is versatile.  
24. Chairperson Af-
fected Mining Land 
Owners & Affected 
Property Owners As-






DYC controversy; National Youth Coalition 
Leader, and District Youth Council leaders not 
good representatives; DYC has done nothing, 
no funding; Must be part of the system to 
change it; used to oppose youth involvement in 
politics, now supports. Boastful about his ac-
complishments: claims organized KH demo.   
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Girls are involved in political violence too; 
leader of Central Youth who spoke at the Peace 
Rally known for brutality, cut ears off and 
starved people, has now cut his hair. They 
clean the streets now.  












Political violence made them close shops early 
(e.g. No. 11); will vote, but not campaign; not 
a member of any groups; problem is diamonds 
and forgetting about education 
27. Young Candidate 
SLPP, Ward 64, 
Community Friendship 






Position/age Political intimidation; finance, age barriers; 
youth have no influence after elections, same is 
true within the party; broken promises; DYC 
not effective. Cooption of Bike Rider’s Execu-
tive leader, KBRU mostly APC supporters.  
28. Young SLPP can-






Position/age Motive – non indigenous leaders neglect de-
velopment, he is a son of the soil. Youth by 
age, not by ability to provide. (He is a teacher, 
provides for friends, but still a youth). If he 
wins would declare APC support. 








Youth age is high bc of the war; violence bc of 
low education, politicians use youth. Youth 
have no capacity to represent themselves – 
need money for politics. 
30. Chairman, Central 








Appointed chairman by elders and youth; a 
non-political group, support government of the 
day; APC brings development; no tension with 
chiefs or police; priority is agriculture 
31. Vice-chair CY and 











They are with the government of the day; all 
views are allowed (despite APC posters and t-
shirts everywhere); farm to feed themselves; 
trying to acquire land from chiefdom; only 
youth leader they know is Adamu; get money 
through street cleaning; no capacity for pro-
posals 
32. Burnt House leader 
(Community meeting 











Over 51 and claims to be a youth 
leader/advisor; old man in the group says he is 
a youth bc he lives among the youth, but others 
around him laugh and say he is not 









Young people don’t have a voice where elders 
are present; buying stories vs. objectivity in 
reporting 




Sia Came from Bo to sell palm oil, hard to make a 
living so prostitution - shame; not a member of 
any orgs because they are quarrelsome and she 
hates violence; those who front projects eat the 
money. 
35. Young construc-
tion shop worker 





position He’s been working there 3 years now, and is 
fit; got the job when the boss asked for his help 
and he was always available and willing; why 
some find it hard to find work? Bad boys. Non 
No.11 participant. 
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Uncle ben is his Father’s best friend and funds 
his education, and he does house chores in ex-
change; wants to be a musician or a journalist; 
took me to see Sam Sumana’s House; CY 
Leader was in jail for stabbing someone over a 
diamond profit dispute; APC youth said SLPP 
will not have a campaign in Koidu, if not will 
be danger in the town bc in presidential elec-
tions did not give APC chance to meet in TNA 
Barry. 
37. SLPP candidate 








NEC list/  
Sia acquaint-
ance 
Claims he was never intimidated, but had fund-
ing problems; uneasy talking on his porch; 
Youth and Sport Committee, only 1 project 
funded in 3 years, on leadership training; most 
time of the 1st term as Local Councillor was 
spent in training.   
38. Secretary Network 









Sia Cost of education – no higher education in 
Kono; story about the sands (sand sold before 
APC made the promise); NMJD gives voice to 
affected communities; he has a good job be-
cause he found a diamond and used the money 
for his education. 










Youth are more active now than before, their 
turn; change due to increased awareness and 
travel; e.g. mayoral candidate for SLPP, a 
younger person.  







at VIP  
Promises of chiefs for help; no money but said 
can go to him (APC big man); orphan, illiter-
ate, has job buying and selling scap metal with 
his older “brother” 










Campaigning and defending activities of CFO; 
most active groups are political; non-violence; 
he founded CFP; cleaning exercises change 
with ruling party (used to be Bagdhad, now 
CY); claims Kariba youth deal sparked no. 11 
(priviledged youth seeking compensation) 
42. Chairman Gun-












Youth Chair  
Cleaning, agriculture, holding shows, and self-
taxation;  they are non-political; plan for pro-
ject proposal “youth watch” to hold politicians 
accountable for promises 









Student and her sis does not love school. GY 
does campaigning, rallies, dancing. Youth 
don’t have a voice around elders. Assertive 
about this, classroom experience.  










Street cleaning, voluntary contributions; sup-
port government of the day, has the power; 
rallies – 3 for LCE, women do cooking.  
45. Coach & Volun-
tary officer for Sports 










Youth policy is not legal; no budget; YES pro-
gramme dead; no list of groups or criteria for 
what is a youth group are available; political 
groups 
46. APC Local Coun-
cillor Aspirant, former 
Vice Chair of Kono 








Politicians target groups (e.g. BRA); was with 
PMDC before joining APC; VP; Job strategy 
to mobilize youth groups; Kariba conflict with 
Assinatu – youth opposed the chiefs and sup-
ported Kariba 
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Reputation Plan to attack sands and kidnap authorities; 
sacrifice of Kono youth; VP “procedure” and 
patienting; was the one to fire the gun and run 
the flag up the hill at No.11 








Most active groups must be political; disgrun-
tled dangerous youths; SLPP supporter always; 
connections needed for jobs; 15 June rally; 
intimidation 
49. Paramount Chief,  
Chairman of Council 









Less diamonds now, jobs harder to come by, 
youth grew up with adult responsibilities; there 
is less hostility now; society has changed, more 
accepting of youth participation; low education 
a huge promise; chiefs and government of the 
day 




TKB also present and appeared to be coaching 
him; origins of tailings; afraid to talk; youth 
against the company 








Ministry Criteria for recognizing community organisa-
tions – non-political a major criteria 











No funding; in kind support; agriculture as an 
alternative to mining; education and training of 
leadership;  








2nd interview Worked for Kariba, one of the original 10, 
never paid; did not demo, does not believe in 
taking law into own hands; District Council 
Chairperson aspirant ordered release of ar-
rested youths; intimidation and apology by 
tormentor after elections 
54. Concord Times 











youth unrest in 
Africa Online 
in Oslo  
Youth AOC promises are only alleged; protests 
oversalaries are cause of some unrest; chiefs 
inciting youths; politicizing youth through 
leadership (he seems very establishment for a 
young journalist!!) 






2nd interview NMJD programmes; support to DYCoalition-
Council is government owned and would be 
politicized; registered youth groups 
56. Honourable Dep-
uty Minister Internal 







Guest at Uncle 
Ben’s 
Vast mineral findings will drive SL’s economic 
regeneration; rooting out corruption through 
clear contracts 
















58. Site supervisor and 
4 workers, including 
one who is the Gbense 
Youth Leader Kariba, 










59. Manager Kariba Corruption 
of chiefs, 




60. Former Kariba 
worker and Central 









alignment of youth leadership with elections; 
youth-company-chiefs conflict 
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Supporting VP; group wants him out bc say 
he’s SLPP; not involved in No.11 








Position A miner, struggle for survival; former CY 
Chair not active; did not go to No.11 because 
was working; plans for agriculture 
63. Youth repairing 







Activity  Watermelon in 2007; did not participate in 
No.11 
64. Support Officer 






Office Rampant mining after 2007 election; arrests 
after No.11; Berewa violence incident 










Politicians come campaign the group, each 
party, but many affiliations within the group 




 Teaching livelihood; not in No.11 
67. Tankoro Youth 
Organization (TA-











Pressuring gov to continue funding; workers 
cultivate land on daily stipend; group not ap-
proached by campaigners; ex-combatants fear 
to tell; inadequate involvement of youth in dev 
planning; political youths 
68. TACYDA member 










SLPP supporter, not public supporter; doesn’t 
know about Central Youths; relatively high ed 
(WASCE exam) 
69. Chairman, Kono 











tral car park 
position Political parties hire bikes out for campaigning 
(not shady, they do for all parties and riders 
forbidden to wear party t-shirts); most riders 
are ex-combatants; want gov support in getting 
jobs at Koidu Holdings and to develop land – 
agricultural plot 
70. Cook, in charge at 
Uncle Ben’s House 
CY Leader  20.07 
Uncle Ben’s 
Guesthouse CY Leader lived with the VP in his compound 
for some 6 months and was his closest body-
guard. VP was a miner.  








APC supporter, but no politics at work; “this 
office, most do a lot of thing for APC” 







In Local council Election only APC came, vote 
for VP; gave money to exec, who ate the 
money (fee for bikes??); SLPP supporter, but 
afraid to say aloud, but no threats to vote APC 
73. Two Central 
Youth, and Hill Station 










Location (CY) Alignment after elections; Central Youths 
originally to help with local defense; military 
gov better 






Location (CY) Government of day; no.11 plan – a security 
75. Alleged Chairman 





Location (CY) Not sure his position is official, no one else has 
mentioned him; being a youth means active 
behaviour – not about age 
76. Central Youths 
member 
NPRC days 21.07 
Central Youths 
Location (CY) Rolling and selling joints; carpenter by training 
but no work. Miner, wants gov to recommend 
CY to Koidu Holdings 
77. Central Youth 
Vice-Chairman Dia-






Location (CY) No.11 and arrests; didn’t hear promise; about 
survival; occasional mining when off season.  
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78. Central Youths 






Location (CY) Large group of youths, all males, who came to 
smoke weed. Must be regular thing as they all 
seemed to appear just as one finished rolling 
the joints. Most are miners. “statehouse”; CY 
rules; low ed; No.11 
79. Number Nine 
Youth Farmers Mem-
ber 
Survival  21.07 
Number 9 
Youths HQ 
Membership No schooling, No.9 helps them to find survival 
through hairdressing and raising pigs;  










Membership O level certificate, used to be in training to be a 
priest but can’t make a living, needed to sup-
port parents; take turns helping to develop each 
other’s personal swamps and profit sharing; 
capacity development 





Membership Form 2 ed; fitter (engineer/mechanic); survival 
through organization; no time for politics  









Membership Chain of command for accessing info 






position Bail of arrested youths (discharged, not acquit-
ted); Senior citizens must stand assurity bc of 
nature of the crime, but can not reveal name 
84. Deputy Chief Ad-
ministrator for Koidu 






position Provide tools for youth who want to help with 
street cleaning (lend); City development plan – 
all society invited to participate; no map of 
Koidu 














Many youths were interested in returning to 
rural areas (in a survey) if they could be guar-






4th meeting Organization tried to remove him for his SLPP 
support, but did not succeed. 30-35% member-
ship APC supporters. 
87. Secretary Central 
Youths, No.11 partici-
pant 
His story 22.07 
Opera 
2nd meeting From Kono, miner; time in the army during the 
war; Central Youth early days, cleaning and 
securing the town;  










Her house, Old 
Yengema 
Sia  Girls off the street project; supporting Tankoro 
Chief with decision about the road repair; Dis-
trict youth council elections without Ministry 
support 






Lansana  What politics contributed to KBRU during 07 
elections; capacity development 










KBRU Leader an APC supporter, but that’s not 
why he won 






24.07 Position Part of the problem with the entire mineral 
sector – communities, not just youth, not in-
volved in decisions; promises for jobs; recom-
mendations; No.11; exploitative civil society 









Recommendations for jobs; offers me money 
to help him leave Salone 
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Location (CY) Marginalisation of SLPP supporters; alignment 
94. Bike Rider Youth 
groups 
25.07 Ride home Membership in youth groups for sociality, not 
campaign groups 
95. Ministry of Agri-









How support youth groups in agriculture; new 
groups coming up bc political will, many their 
first time in agriculture 
96. Operations Direc-
tor for Mineral Com-











Position Chiefs and corruption and link to youth unem-
ployment; large scale agriculture plan, philan-
thropic financiers; government of the day; VP, 
No.11 and Chief discussion 














Ward committees useless; plans to hold a 
meeting to unite the youth groups; fourth for-
mer ed; anger towards SLPP who provoked 
No.11, who sold the land; youth mined sansan 
before SLPP 
98. Gunpoint Youth, 
No.11 observer  





Stranded musician from Freetown, witnessed 
No.11, sparked by SLPP provocative statement 
99. Balance Youths 














Balance and Central Youth relations – power 
struggle downplayed; mining mainly bc no 
support for agriculture; street cleaning divide 
areas; NPRC days open mining; shame of not 
being able to buy a drink; anger towards SLPP 
“sabotaging VP who we want to be our father” 
100. District Youth 







2nd meeting Need recommendation of the Youth Leader to 
the District/City Council; doesn’t want to dis-
cuss No.11 
101. District Youth 
Officer Ministry Youth 







Position SLPP youth programmes; NPRC reviving 
youth policy; local council youth committees; 
low capacity of youth in writing projects and 
approaching donors 
102. Ministry Youth 









NPRC youth policy; new Youth Commission – 
independent and taking on all youth issues 
103. APC Candidate 










Youth roadblock to support APC Candidate 
Follow-up interviews on No.11 by Sia, February 2009 




Sia  Youth aware of illegality of No.11. Update on 
No.11 and visit of President.  




Youth aware of illegality of No.11. Update on 
No.11 and visit of President. 




No.11 apology to VP 
107. No.11 participant No.11 12.02.09 
No.11 Village 







Company relationship with youth 
109. Councillor and  
Deputy Mayor 
No.11  13.02.09 
Koidu 
Sia No.11update on gov response 
Delegation to VP 











 Future outlook 
 
